People v. Nelson
1 Cal. 5th 513
| Cal. | 2016Background
- Defendant Sergio Dujuan Nelson, a former Target employee, shot and killed coworkers Robin Shirley and Lee Thompson in a store parking lot; he was convicted of first‑degree murder, with special circumstances for multiple murders and lying in wait, and found eligible for death. Two jury penalty-phase trials were held; the first ended in a mistrial (hung jury) and the second returned a death verdict. The convictions are automatic appeals.
- Key facts supporting guilt: Nelson armed himself, brought a bicycle to the scene, approached the victims from behind at their parked car, fired multiple rounds through an open rear window, returned to fire again, then fled; ballistics tied the recovered gun to the scene.
- Defense theory: Nelson conceded the shootings but argued lack of premeditation (impulsive act) and presented psychiatric evidence of severe mental illness (diagnoses contested by prosecution experts).
- At trial the court admitted expert testimony (a criminalist’s shot‑sequence opinion), refused several defense instruction requests (heat of passion, third‑party provocation, voluntary manslaughter based on mental illness), and instructed on lying‑in‑wait theory and special circumstance.
- Post‑verdict, the Supreme Court reversed only the lying‑in‑wait special‑circumstance finding for insufficient evidence and reversed the penalty verdict because the trial court intruded improperly into juror deliberations during the penalty retrial, requiring a new penalty trial; remaining convictions were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Nelson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of criminalist’s shot‑sequence opinion | Expert had sufficient training/experience in crime‑scene reconstruction to assist jury | Devine lacked ballistics/reconstruction expertise; testimony speculative | Admission proper; court did not abuse discretion (opinion admissible) |
| Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) | No adequate evidence of provocation or jealous rage to warrant instruction | Claimed he acted in sudden jealous rage and mental disturbance meriting manslaughter instruction | No substantial evidence supported heat‑of‑passion; refusal not error |
| Sufficiency of evidence for lying‑in‑wait special circumstance | Evidence showed concealment, surprise attack, watching/waiting period | Nelson argued no substantial period of watching/waiting; arrival timing unknown | Reversed: insufficient evidence of the required substantial period of watching and waiting for special circumstance (special‑circumstance vacated) |
| Trial court inquiry into penalty‑phase deadlock and juror questioning | Court may take limited steps when jury reports impasse and may probe for misconduct | Inquiry and questionnaire intruded on secret deliberations and coerced jury; violated defendant’s rights | Reversed penalty verdict: court’s questionnaire and in‑chambers questioning impermissibly invaded deliberative secrecy and likely coerced jury; remand for new penalty trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (criminal suspects must receive Miranda warnings)
- Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (capital defendant entitled to instruction on lesser included noncapital offense when evidence supports it)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing penalty must be found by jury beyond reasonable doubt)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional error)
- People v. Engelman, 28 Cal.4th 436 (limits on judicial intrusion into jury deliberations; protection of secrecy)
- People v. Carter, 36 Cal.4th 1215 (addressed sufficiency for lying‑in‑wait special circumstance)
- People v. Morales, 48 Cal.3d 527 (elements of lying‑in‑wait special circumstance)
- People v. Moon, 37 Cal.4th 1 (short waiting periods can suffice for lying‑in‑wait when sufficient for premeditation)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (competency standards for trial)