People v. Navarra, F071142

Background

Defendant Brittany Navarra (16 at the time) was convicted by jury of first‑degree murder, first‑degree burglary, and conspiracy; lying‑in‑wait special circumstance found true as to the killing of Krista Pike; sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).
Prosecution theory: defendant recruited and encouraged Dustin Gran to kill Pike, texted him during the day of the murder, and urged him not to give up; Gran committed the killing; strong forensic and circumstantial evidence (injuries, blood, photos, recovered jeans, zip ties, texts) corroborated Gran’s role and defendant’s involvement.
Defense presented psychological evaluations portraying Navarra as dependent, suggestible, impaired, and possibly a follower rather than the planner; contested admission of Gran’s convictions and statements, and challenged sufficiency of lying‑in‑wait proof and LWOP sentence for a juvenile.
Trial court admitted certified records of Gran’s convictions and Gran’s statements to a court‑appointed psychologist (redacted as to Navarra), and instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and first‑degree murder (premeditation and lying in wait).
On appeal, the court addressed multiple claims (admission of Gran’s convictions and NGI statements; instructional error; sufficiency of lying‑in‑wait evidence; Eighth Amendment/Miller issues as applied to juvenile LWOP), and later considered whether Proposition 57 (juvenile transfer provisions) applies retroactively.

Issues

Issue	State/Respondent Argument	Navarra Argument	Held
Admission of Gran’s convictions and records	Admissible under Evid. Code §452.5 as evidence of Gran’s commission of underlying crimes; any error harmless given other evidence	Admission violated confrontation, jury trial, and due process rights; risk of guilt by association	Any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction affirmed
Admission of Gran’s statements to psychologist (NGI exam)	Statements against interest admissible (Evid. Code §1230); redactions prevented Crawford/Bruton problems; harmless if error	Admission violated Confrontation Clause because statements were testimonial and defendant could not cross‑examine Gran	Statements admissible as declarations against penal interest or harmless if error; no reversible Crawford/Bruton violation
Instructional wording (CALCRIM 521 using "he/she")	Jury was properly instructed on aider/abettor liability; instructions considered as a whole prevented convicting Navarra based on Gran’s mental state	Instruction permitted jury to convict Navarra based on Gran’s mental state rather than her own	No reasonable likelihood jury was misled; instructional claim rejected
Retroactivity of Proposition 57 (juvenile transfer)	Proposition 57 not expressly retroactive; Estrada exemption applies only to laws that mitigate punishment for a particular offense; Miller/Montgomery do not require transfer hearings	Prop. 57 must apply retroactively to juveniles with LWOP (to effectuate Miller/Montgomery substantive rule)	Proposition 57 does not apply retroactively to defendants already tried, convicted, and sentenced but with nonfinal appeals; Montgomery does not entitle juveniles to a transfer hearing; judgment affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause governs testimonial hearsay)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional error harmless only if beyond a reasonable doubt)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _ (2016) (Miller announced substantive rule made retroactive)
Estrada v. California, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) (amendments reducing punishment presumed retroactive when judgment not final—narrowly construed)
People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014) (application of Miller factors and juvenile LWOP framework)
People v. Johnson, 62 Cal.4th 600 (2016) (lying‑in‑wait special circumstance analysis)