People v. Nagi, 2014 COA 12

Farouk Nagi was charged with sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust — pattern of abuse; he pleaded not guilty and trial was set within the six‑month speedy‑trial window.
Defendant expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, sought new counsel, then vacillated between retaining counsel, using alternate counsel (ADC), and representing himself; the court conducted an Arguello advisement about self‑representation.
Original counsel moved for a continuance to investigate out‑of‑state and foreign witnesses; defendant insisted on a speedy trial and initially opposed a continuance.
On June 20, with trial imminent and counsel absent, the court vacated the trial date and ordered a competency evaluation at CMHIP based on concerns about defendant’s decision‑making and inconsistent behavior.
CMHIP found defendant competent; he later represented himself at trial beginning August 30, 2011, was convicted, and received an indeterminate 12 years to life sentence.
On appeal defendant argued (1) the competency evaluation was unjustified and thus the exclusion of that period violated his statutory speedy‑trial right, and (2) the trial court improperly aggravated his sentencing range as a crime of violence and extraordinary risk crime.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court properly excluded the competency‑evaluation period from the six‑month speedy‑trial clock	Court/prosecution: trial court had "reason to believe" incompetence due to defendant's inconsistent decisions and statements; exclusion applies under § 18‑1‑405(6)(a)	Nagi: evaluation was unfounded and ordered merely because he chose to represent himself; exclusion improperly extended the speedy‑trial period	Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion ordering evaluation; low "reason to believe" threshold met and the evaluation period was properly excluded
Whether sentencing range was improperly aggravated	Prosecution: offense is a per se crime of violence; crime‑of‑violence sentencing applies without separate proof	Nagi: prosecution had to plead/prove crime of violence or bodily‑injury/threat element to aggravate sentence	Partially affirmed — offense is a per se crime of violence so crime‑of‑violence aggravation was proper; trial court erred in also applying extraordinary‑risk aggravation but sentence fell within correct range so conviction affirmed

People v. Walker, 252 P.3d 551 (Colo. App. 2011) (standard of review for statutory speedy‑trial application)
Cappelli v. Demlow, 935 P.2d 57 (Colo. App. 1996) ("reason to believe" threshold for competency evaluation is low)
People v. Scherrer, 670 P.2d 18 (Colo. App. 1983) (court must suspend proceedings if any doubt as to competency)
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (U.S. 1975) (trying an incompetent defendant violates due process)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1993) (competency standard for waiving counsel mirrors competency to stand trial)
People v. Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936 (Colo. App. 2009) (defendant must have rational and factual understanding of proceedings)
People v. Luman, 994 P.2d 432 (Colo. App. 1999) (abuse of discretion standard description)
People v. Banks, 9 P.3d 1125 (Colo. 2000) (statute can designate an offense a per se crime of violence for sentencing)
People in Interest of A.B.-B., 215 P.3d 1205 (Colo. App. 2009) (per se crimes of violence need not be proved under the crime‑of‑violence statute)
People v. Santanctr-Medrano, 165 P.3d 804 (Colo. App. 2006) (when underlying crime is not per se crime of violence, separate count is required to enhance under § 18‑1.3‑406)
People v. Young, 987 P.2d 889 (Colo. App. 1999) (sentence within alternative correct ranges is not reversible)