52 Cal.App.5th 464
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- Defendant Frederick Munch was convicted of multiple child sexual offenses and sentenced to a determinate term of 26 years plus a consecutive 15 years to life.
- The child complainant testified to repeated sexual abuse from ages 6–11; there was a significant delay in disclosure and some affectionate/ambivalent behavior toward defendant (letters, calls him like a grandfather).
- Police recovered numerous photographs of the child and the defendant; defendant made admissions to police about sexual contact but testified at trial that much of the conduct was initiated or consensual play by the child and denied penetration or ejaculation.
- The prosecution presented Dr. Anthony Urquiza to give CSAAS (Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome) testimony about common victim behaviors (delayed disclosure, ambivalence, recantation) to rebut defense suggestions that the child’s conduct undermined credibility.
- The central legal dispute on appeal was whether admitting CSAAS testimony (and giving CALCRIM No. 1193) was erroneous, whether CSAAS must pass Kelly/Frye scientific-admissibility standards, and whether Evidence Code §352 exclusion was required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of CSAAS evidence to rehabilitate child witness | CSAAS is admissible to explain behaviors jurors may misinterpret and to rehabilitate credibility when defense attacks conduct | CSAAS is outdated, prejudicial, and no longer necessary given public awareness and recent decisions in other jurisdictions | Affirmed: CSAAS admissible under People v. McAlpin to rebut inferences that complainant’s behavior shows fabrication |
| Need for Kelly/Frye reliability showing for CSAAS | CSAAS is long-established clinical testimony, not a novel scientific technique; Kelly/Frye not required | CSAAS should be excluded absent Frye/Kelly reliability vetting | Rejected: Frye/Kelly does not apply to clinical-experience-based CSAAS testimony; traditional expert standards suffice |
| CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction | Instruction properly limits CSAAS: cannot be used to prove the defendant committed the crimes but may be used to evaluate whether complainant’s conduct is consistent with abused children | Instruction improperly lowers burden of proof by allowing expert testimony to affect belief in defendant’s guilt | Rejected: Instruction lawful and not misleading; jurors can use CSAAS only to assess believability, not to prove guilt |
| Evidence Code §352 prejudice balancing | CSAAS testimony was brief, benign, and relevant to rebut impeachment from the complainant’s delay/affection; limiting instructions minimized prejudice | CSAAS was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded under §352 | Rejected: Trial court did not abuse discretion; even if error, no reasonable probability of a different outcome given admissions and corroborating evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal.3d 1289 (1991) (CSAAS admissible to rehabilitate child witness when defense attacks post‑incident conduct such as delayed disclosure)
- People v. Gonzales, 16 Cal.App.5th 494 (2017) (CALCRIM No. 1193 appropriately explains limits and uses of CSAAS testimony)
- People v. Harlan, 222 Cal.App.3d 439 (1990) (Kelly/Frye test inapplicable to expert testimony grounded in clinical experience and professional literature)
- People v. Julian, 34 Cal.App.5th 878 (2019) (recognizing continued admissibility and relevance of CSAAS evidence)
- Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (CSAAS testimony admissible in federal child‑sexual‑abuse trials when not used to opine on a specific child’s truthfulness)
- United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997) (CSAAS admissible and Frye does not bar clinical CSAAS testimony)
- State v. J.L.G., 190 A.3d 442 (N.J. 2018) (contrasting decision limiting aspects of CSAAS; court found only delayed disclosure had sufficient scientific acceptance)