People v. Mumin
15 Cal.5th 176
Cal.2023Background
- In April 2015 Ahmed Mumin robbed a convenience store and fatally shot a customer; later, police traced evidence to him and searched an apartment complex where he hid in a community room.
- Detectives Mackay and Johnson approached the room: Mackay opened Door 1 while Johnson stood about 25 feet to the left in line with Door 2.
- Mumin fired three hollow‑point rounds: one through the opening at Door 1 and two through closed Door 2; neither officer was hit; ballistics linked Mumin to the earlier murder.
- At trial Mumin was convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted murder of both officers; the jury was instructed on the concurrent‑intent ("kill‑zone") theory for at least one attempted‑murder count.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed; the California Supreme Court granted review to resolve the proper standard of review for kill‑zone instructions and whether the instruction was supported by substantial evidence.
- Holding: the conventional substantial‑evidence standard governs instruction decisions, but on these facts the concurrent‑intent instruction as applied to Detective Johnson was unsupported and prejudicial, so that attempted‑murder conviction was reversed; the conviction as to Mackay was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard of review for a trial court’s decision to give a concurrent‑intent (kill‑zone) instruction | Prosecution: apply traditional substantial‑evidence review; instruction may be given if record contains evidence from which a rational jury could infer concurrent intent | Mumin: trial and appellate courts must conclude themselves that the only reasonable inference is concurrent intent (a higher standard) | Court: apply ordinary substantial‑evidence standard; jury, not judge, determines whether an inference is the only reasonable one |
| Whether the evidence supported giving a concurrent‑intent instruction as to Detective Johnson | AG: three rapid shots into the doors, hollow‑points, and defendant’s motive/supporting facts allow inference Mumin intended to kill officers generally (including Johnson) | Mumin: three shots into an open area, distance and lack of hits show only a risk‑creation (conscious disregard), not intent to kill everyone in a kill zone | Court: insufficient evidence to support a kill‑zone inference as to Johnson; instruction should not have been given |
| Prejudice standard for an improperly given concurrent‑intent instruction | AG: harmless because other valid theories could support verdict | Mumin: instruction was legally defective and prejudiced him on Johnson count | Court: instruction was legally inadequate and likely misled jury; Chapman standard applies and error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Johnson (conviction reversed); Mackay conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (Cal. 2019) (clarified contours and limits of the kill‑zone/concurrent‑intent theory and cautioned narrow application)
- People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 2002) (recognized concurrent intent inference but rejected transfer of intent for attempted murder)
- People v. Stone, 46 Cal.4th 131 (Cal. 2009) (discussed inferences of intent in multi‑victim shootings; distinguished indiscriminate shooters)
- People v. Perez, 50 Cal.4th 222 (Cal. 2010) (rejected blanket application of kill‑zone analysis to single‑bullet/multi‑victim scenarios)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (established reviewing‑court standard: whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element)
- In re Rayford, 50 Cal.App.5th 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (illustrative Court of Appeal decision that misapplied Canizales by substituting appellate weighing of reasonable inferences; disapproved in this opinion)