People v. Mumaugh
2018 IL App (3d) 140961
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2018Background
- On June 21, 2012, at ~10:30 p.m. on a dark, unlit rural road, Brandon Mumaugh struck 12‑year‑old pedestrian Jennifer Dennis; she suffered grave, permanent injuries.
- Mumaugh was driving ~50 mph (below the 55 mph limit) in his proper lane with functioning headlights; the pedestrian was walking in/near the roadway wearing dark clothing without reflectors.
- Officers found no signs of impairment at the scene; Mumaugh passed field sobriety tests and admitted smoking cannabis five days earlier. A "hitter" pipe at the scene contained Mumaugh's DNA and .2 grams of cannabis; THC metabolite was detected in his urine.
- Mumaugh was convicted after a stipulated bench trial of aggravated DUI under the 2012 statute (driving with any amount of cannabis in body + accident causing great bodily harm where the violation was a proximate cause).
- The trial court relied on precedents treating section 11‑501(a)(6) as a strict‑liability offense and found the elements satisfied; Mumaugh appealed, challenging proximate causation and facial constitutionality of the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Mumaugh) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved proximate cause between Mumaugh’s driving and the victim’s injuries | State: Any driving that results in injury while a forbidden substance is present satisfies the causation element; accidents are foreseeable. | Mumaugh: The pedestrian’s unforeseen, unlawful conduct (walking in the center of a dark rural road in dark clothes) was the sole proximate cause; no evidence of negligent driving or impairment. | Reversed — State failed to prove proximate cause; reasonable trier of fact could not find causation beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Whether the 2012 strict‑liability aggravated‑DUI statute (any THC amount) is constitutional under substantive due process | State: Statute is permissible to keep drug‑impaired drivers off roads; strict‑liability framework upheld by precedent. | Mumaugh: The statute criminalizes innocent conduct and is not rationally related to protecting against impairment. | Not reached — court avoided constitutional question because reversal on proximate‑cause ground was dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102 (Illinois Supreme Court) (strict‑liability DUI provision presumes impairment but aggravated DUI requires proof that driving was a proximate cause)
- First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252 (1999) (distinguishing condition from proximate cause; unforeseeable intervening act severs legal causation)
- Reuter v. Korb, 248 Ill. App. 3d 142 (1993) (pedestrian suddenly appearing in dark roadway was sole proximate cause where driver was lawful and driving at speed limit)
- People v. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d 267 (1994) (statute creates an absolute bar to driving after ingesting a controlled substance regardless of impairment)
- People v. Way, 2017 IL 120023 (Illinois Supreme Court) (defendant may assert that an unforeseen medical condition solely caused the accident; State must prove defendant’s driving was a proximate cause in context where fault is established)