People v. Mosley
2015 IL 115872
| Ill. | 2015Background
- Defendant (age 19) was stopped in a Chicago park, ran from police, pulled and dropped an uncased, loaded .32 revolver; he had no FOID card.
- Charged with one UUW count and six AUUW counts combining 24-1.6(a)(1)/(a)(2) with factors (a)(3)(A) (uncased/loaded/immediately accessible), (C) (no FOID), and (I) (under-21 handgun restriction).
- After a bench trial the court convicted on all counts except one UUW count; later the trial court found portions of the AUUW statute unconstitutional (facially and as applied), vacated the six AUUW convictions and entered a misdemeanor UUW conviction, sentencing defendant to jail and probation.
- State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court under Rule 603; the Supreme Court reviewed constitutional and severability issues and whether the trial court’s posttrial actions (vacatur, entry of lesser offense) were an acquittal barring appeal.
- The Supreme Court affirmed vacation of AUUW counts that relied on (a)(3)(A) (following People v. Aguilar), reversed vacation of counts based on (a)(3)(C) (FOID) and (a)(3)(I) (under-21), held sentencing subsection (d)(2) invalid because it depended on the void (a)(3)(A), vacated the misdemeanor UUW conviction and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Mosley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AUUW subsection (a)(3)(A) (uncased, loaded, immediately accessible) violates the Second Amendment | Subsection is constitutional regulation of firearm carriage | Subsection is a flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home; infringes Second Amendment | Subsection (a)(3)(A) invalid (affirmed vacatur of counts II and V), consistent with Aguilar |
| Whether subsection (a)(3)(C) (no FOID) and (a)(3)(I) (under-21) are severable from invalid (a)(3)(A) and constitutional | These factors are valid, severable, and protect public safety | They are inseparable from the invalid (a)(3)(A) and thus doomed | (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) are severable and constitutional (counts III, IV, VI, VII reinstated) |
| Whether FOID and under-21 restrictions violate Second Amendment for 18–20 year olds | State: these are permissible, historically rooted or regulable restrictions | Defendant: age 18–20 are "the People"; restrictions unconstitutionally disarm them | Restrictions are not core Second Amendment conduct for 18–20s; provisions survive Wilson textual/historical inquiry |
| Whether defendant’s as-applied due process challenge to FOID provisions is procedurally ripe / proven | State: no evidence defendant applied for or was denied a FOID; no as-applied record | Defendant: FOID scheme effectively bars him due to parents’ felonies | As-applied due process claim rejected for lack of evidentiary record; facial challenge fails because FOID statute allows appeal/waiver routes |
| Validity of sentencing subsection (d)(2) (mandatory prison when (A) and (C) present) and proportionate penalties challenge | State: (d)(2) applies where the facts corresponding to (A) and (C) are present; provision constitutional | Defendant/trial court: (d)(2) mandates non-probationable prison and violates proportionate penalties; linked to invalid (a)(3)(A) | (d)(2) invalid because it depends on void (a)(3)(A); proportionate-penalties issue unnecessary to decide; remand for sentencing under remaining valid provisions |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (Illinois Supreme Court) (invalidated AUUW subsection prohibiting carrying uncased, loaded, immediately accessible firearms outside the home)
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (held Illinois flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home unconstitutional)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (individual right to possess firearms for lawful purposes, including self-defense)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment against the states)
- People v. Wilson, 2012 IL 112026 (Illinois Supreme Court) (two-step approach: textual/historical inquiry then means-ends scrutiny)
- People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1 (1998) (definition and effect of an acquittal by the trier of fact)
- People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337 (2009) (posttrial judicial invalidation of statute and entry of lesser offense can be reversed)
- People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122 (Illinois Supreme Court) (void ab initio doctrine: facially invalid statutes are void from enactment)
- People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198 (2003) (severability principles: invalid provision may be severed if remainder is complete and executable)