People v. Morrow, 146 N.E.3d 85

Mitchell Morrow was convicted of first‑degree murder and armed robbery; the trial court sentenced him to 60 years for murder and 20 years (concurrent) for armed robbery; this court later vacated the armed robbery conviction on direct appeal.
At sentencing the trial judge found Morrow death‑penalty eligible based on accountability but declined death and imposed 60 years for murder (May 28, 1996); there is no transcript or record of any separate resentencing after the armed‑robbery vacatur.
Morrow filed multiple postconviction and collateral petitions over many years; his 1999 postconviction counsel (Granich) argued for resentencing after the robbery vacatur, but the trial court dismissed the petition and later denied relief; this court previously rejected a due‑process/excessive‑sentence claim based on the vacated robbery.
In 2014–2016 Morrow (through the Public Defender) sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to ask this court to remand for resentencing after the armed‑robbery vacatur; the trial court denied leave for lack of cause and prejudice.
On appeal the court applied the Illinois Post‑Conviction Hearing Act framework for successive petitions (cause‑and‑prejudice test) and affirmed the denial, holding Morrow failed to show either prejudice (no evidence the vacated robbery influenced the murder sentence) or cause (similar claims had been raised earlier).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Morrow)	Held
Whether leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging appellate counsel was ineffective for not seeking remand for resentencing should be granted	Deny leave: Morrow cannot show cause or prejudice; record shows no resentencing and nothing indicates the vacated robbery affected the murder sentence	Appellate counsel was ineffective by not requesting remand for resentencing after the robbery vacatur; postconviction counsel was ineffective for not raising that appellate‑counsel claim earlier; resentencing is required	Affirmed. Leave denied: Morrow failed to show prejudice (no evidence sentence was influenced by vacated conviction) and failed to show cause (substantially similar claim had been raised previously)
Whether Morrow established cause to excuse not raising the resentencing claim earlier	Claim fails: Morrow previously pressed the same due‑process/excessive‑sentence argument and appellate counsel’s conduct could have been raised earlier; Harris (statute‑of‑limitations scenario) is inapposite	Counsel could not be required to assert their own ineffectiveness while still on direct appeal; multiple counsel and confusing record prevented earlier presentation	Affirmed. No cause: substantially the same claim had already been raised and decided, and circumstances here differ from the limited Harris exception

People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711 (Illinois Supreme Court: overview of Post‑Conviction Hearing Act and successive‑petition standards)
People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688 (Second‑stage standard and structure of postconviction review)
People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946 (Higher cause‑and‑prejudice standard for successive petitions)
People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860 (Remand for appointment of postconviction counsel after leave granted)
People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123 (Successive petition docketing directly to second stage once leave granted)
People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115 (2007) (limited exception recognizing cause where statute of limitations forced filing before appellate counsel had filed any brief)
People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491 (1998) (sentencing issues on direct appeal and waiver principles)
People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285 (2004) (an attorney cannot be expected to argue his own ineffectiveness)