514 P.3d 811
Cal.2022Background
- Defendant Valdamir Morelos (pro se at trial) was convicted after a bench trial of first‑degree murder and found to have used a firearm and to have committed three special circumstances (robbery, specified sexual acts, torture); death sentence imposed. Two prior serious‑felony enhancements and two prior prison‑term enhancements were found; one 1‑year prior prison term later held unauthorized and vacated.
- Morelos waived counsel (Faretta) and jury for guilt and penalty phases; he testified at both phases and admitted conduct underlying guilt and aggravation. Trial court weighed aggravating v. mitigating factors and imposed death.
- Morelos raised multiple challenges on appeal: validity of his Faretta waiver in a capital case; statutory constraints (Pen. Code § 686.1 and § 1018) on self‑representation and guilty pleas in capital cases; denial/failure to appoint advisory (Keenan) counsel; validity of his jury waivers; prosecutorial conduct and fairness/reliability of the proceedings; and entitlement to posttrial review under § 190.4.
- The Supreme Court of California upheld the conviction and death sentence but struck the one‑year § 667.5(b) prior‑term enhancement and remanded for resentencing to allow the trial court to consider (under recently enacted Senate Bills) whether to strike the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5) and prior serious felony enhancements (§ 667).
- The court rejected challenges to the applicability of Faretta in capital cases, rejected the claim that § 686.1 overrides Faretta, found denial of advisory counsel (if any) harmless, and held Morelos validly waived jury after a totality‑of‑circumstances review. Dissent argued the jury waiver was not knowingly intelligent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Morelos) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Faretta/self‑representation in capital case | Faretta governs; defendant may validly waive counsel if competent and waiver knowing and voluntary | Faretta should not apply in capital cases; counsel is essential safeguard against arbitrary death sentence | Court: Faretta applies in capital cases; Morelos validly waived counsel (competent and informed) |
| Statutory bar (§ 686.1) on self‑representation in capital cases | § 686.1 cannot displace Faretta where inconsistent | § 686.1 requires counsel at all stages in capital cases, so waiver invalid | Court: § 686.1 cannot be enforced to abrogate Faretta; defendant may represent self |
| Denial/failure to appoint advisory (Keenan) counsel | If appointment was discretionary, denial would not be abuse here; any error harmless under Watson | Requested advisory counsel (assistant/Keenan) and denial prejudiced defense | Court: Keenan inapplicable to a pro se defendant; denial would not be abuse of discretion and any error harmless |
| Section 1018 / "slow plea" and Eighth Amendment reliability | Prosecutor/People: proceeding was a trial, not a guilty plea; no §1018 violation; defendant knowingly chose tactics | Morelos: his self‑representation, refusal to present mitigation, and effective cooperation with prosecution amounted to a de facto guilty plea/slow plea in violation of §1018 and violated Eighth/Fourteenth | Court: Proceedings were an actual trial (People put to proof); not a slow plea; §1018 not implicated; no Eighth/Fourteenth violation |
| Validity of jury waivers (guilt, special circumstances, penalty) | Waivers were knowing, intelligent and voluntary under totality: multiple colloquies, discussions over months, defendant confirmed waiver repeatedly | Waiver colloquies were too thin; defendant was pro se; prosecutor drove bench‑trial preference; waiver lacked affirmative, robust advisement (no discussion of unanimity, jury selection, judge as sole factfinder) | Court: Waivers valid; record shows adequate advisement and repeated, voluntary waivers. Dissent disagreed, would find waiver invalid |
| Posttrial modification review (§ 190.4) and equal protection | Court’s on‑the‑record statement of reasons and defendant’s refusal of rehearing satisfied review; no constitutional right to independent second‑judge review | Defendant argued §190.4(e) requires independent review when jury waived or otherwise denial of equal protection | Court: No constitutional defect; defendant waived further motion; automatic appellate review suffices |
| Sentencing adjustments under new statutes | People conceded limited retroactivity; court should remand to consider judicial discretion to strike enhancements under Senate Bills 620 and 1393; SB 136 requires striking the §667.5(b) one‑year prior term | Remand requested to allow trial court exercise of new discretion; strike ineligible prior term | Court: Remanded for consideration of striking firearm and serious‑felony enhancements; struck §667.5(b) one‑year enhancement as unauthorized |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (defendant has Sixth Amendment right to self‑representation)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (competency standard for waiving rights)
- McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (counsel cannot concede guilt over defendant’s express objection)
- People v. Bloom, 48 Cal.3d 1194 (self‑representation in penalty phase and reliability considerations)
- People v. Chadd, 28 Cal.3d 739 (§1018 consent‑of‑counsel in capital guilty pleas upheld)
- People v. Daniels, 3 Cal.5th 961 (jury‑waiver standards; difference between bench‑trial waiver contexts)
- People v. Sivongxxay, 3 Cal.5th 151 (guidance on jury‑waiver colloquies and statutory waiver of special‑circumstance jury)
- People v. Crandell, 46 Cal.3d 833 (advisory counsel framework and Keenan counsel principles)