67 Cal.App.5th 326
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Defendant Luis Javier Morales Jr. fired six .40-caliber rounds toward a parked, occupied Cadillac; 18‑year‑old Ilaysia M. (seven months pregnant) was fatally shot and her fetus died from maternal blood loss.
- Witnesses placed Morales at the scene, observed him point/shoot, and ShotSpotter detected six shots; six casings from the same gun were recovered near the scene.
- Morales was convicted by jury of two counts of first‑degree murder (counts 1–2), attempted murder (count 3), shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 4), and felon in possession (count 5); jury found a multiple‑murder special circumstance and several §12022.53 firearm‑use enhancements.
- Trial court imposed LWOP for the special‑circumstance and two consecutive 25‑to‑life terms for the murders; firearm enhancements were found true but their 25‑to‑life terms were stayed.
- Morales appealed raising: prosecutorial misconduct/ineffective assistance (comments about jurors reporting non‑deliberation), kill‑zone instruction sufficiency/error for attempted murder (post‑Canizales), instructional error on §12022.53(d) (omitting “other than an accomplice” for count 1), sentencing errors (unauthorized sentences, remand under §12022.53(h)), and equal‑protection challenges to juvenile/young‑adult parole statutes.
- The Court modified the abstract of judgment: converted the special‑circumstance sentence into LWOP on counts 1 and 2, struck the §12022.53(d) enhancement as to count 1, and otherwise affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Morales) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutor's closing remarks urging jurors to report non‑deliberation; counsel ineffective for not objecting | Remarks were permissible reminders to follow law and report misconduct; no prejudice | Remarks intruded into deliberations (post‑Engelman), chilled minority views; counsel ineffective for failing to object | Forfeiture of non‑objected claim; even assuming impropriety, no prejudice shown under Strickland/Chapman — claim fails |
| Kill‑zone instruction for attempted murder (post‑Canizales) — sufficiency and instructional error | Evidence supported an attempted‑murder theory; instruction was appropriate | Kill‑zone inapplicable; instruction legally erroneous after Canizales; insufficient evidence to support it | Court found kill‑zone theory not necessary and, even if error, harmless under Chapman because instruction required intent to kill occupants and prosecutor argued express‑intent theory |
| §12022.53(d) firearm‑use enhancement (count 1) — omitted "other than an accomplice" language in instruction | Omission harmless or inapplicable because victim cannot be an accomplice to own murder | Victim (Ilaysia) could have been an accomplice (e.g., to §415 conspiracy); omission deprived due process and jury determination on accomplice status | Error: instruction should have included accomplice exception per People v. Flores; enhancement for count 1 reversed and 25‑to‑life enhancement vacated |
| Sentencing (LWOP + consecutive 25‑to‑life on counts) — legality of imposing LWOP plus consecutive 25‑to‑life | Sentence imposed appropriately | Sentence unauthorized: cannot impose separate LWOP for special‑circumstance plus consecutive 25‑to‑life on counts | Modified: strike the 25‑to‑life terms on counts 1 and 2 and the special‑circumstance entry; impose LWOP on counts 1 and 2 instead (correct abstract of judgment) |
| Remand for exercise of discretion under §12022.53(h) to strike enhancements | Trial court might not have known about §12022.53(h); remand required | Trial court presumed aware; record silent and court showed leniency by staying enhancements | No remand: silent record does not show the court misunderstood its discretion; remand unnecessary |
| Equal‑protection challenges to §§1170(d)(2), 190.5(b), 3051 (exclusion of 18–25 youthful offenders from some resentencing/parole opportunities) | Statutory distinctions are rationally based (legislative line at 18; remedial purposes for juveniles; severity of crimes) | Excluding youthful LWOP offenders is irrational and denies equal protection given neurological science up to age 25 | Rejected under rational‑basis review for §§1170(d)(2) and 190.5(b); §3051 challenge also rejected though concurrence criticized rationality and urged legislative reconsideration |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Engelman, 28 Cal.4th 436 (2002) (court cautioned against jury instruction compelling jurors to report non‑deliberation and exercised supervisory power to bar it)
- People v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019) (clarified narrow standards for applying the kill‑zone theory of attempted murder)
- People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (2002) (adopted kill‑zone theory where defendant used means creating a zone of fatal harm)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard for constitutional error)
- People v. Flores, 129 Cal.App.4th 174 (2005) (§12022.53(d) accomplice exception may apply when victim was an accomplice to the underlying intended crime; omission of that element is prejudicial)
- People v. Barnwell, 41 Cal.4th 1038 (2007) (court and prosecutorial comments urging jurors to report misconduct may not establish constitutional error where no refusal to deliberate appears)
- In re Jones, 42 Cal.App.5th 477 (2019) (rejected equal‑protection challenge to §1170(d)(2) distinction between juvenile and young‑adult LWOP offenders)
- People v. Acosta, 60 Cal.App.5th 769 (2021) (upheld §3051 exclusion of youthful LWOP offenders under rational‑basis review; urged Legislature reconsider scope)
- People v. Aledamat, 8 Cal.5th 1 (2019) (Chapman harmless‑error framework applies when jury was given legally inadequate theory)