19 Cal. App. 5th 889
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Defendant Jimmy Moore, with long-term PCP use and prior convictions, smoked PCP, acted erratically, and caused extensive damage to a convenience store storeroom and parking garage; police found meth in his backpack after arrest.
- Charged with two counts of vandalism (Pen. Code § 594) with alleged damage over $400, possession of a controlled substance (Health & Safety Code § 11377(a)), and resisting an officer; jury convicted on vandalism and possession, deadlocked on resisting.
- Moore presented evidence (and expert testimony) that he was dissociative from PCP use and requested a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense to vandalism and resisting an officer; the court instructed only as to resisting an officer and excluded it for vandalism.
- At trial the court limited psychiatric/mental-state evidence to the resisting-officer charge; defendant nevertheless argued intoxication negated malice in closing for vandalism.
- At sentencing the court dismissed prior strikes, granted formal probation with various conditions (including warrantless searches and probation officer approval of residence/employment); Moore did not object to most probation conditions and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary intoxication is a defense to vandalism | People: vandalism is a general intent crime; intoxication inadmissible to negate general intent | Moore: inclusion of "maliciously" makes vandalism a specific-intent or requires a specific mental state that intoxication can negate | Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to vandalism; vandalism is a general intent crime and "maliciously" does not create specific intent |
| Whether malice ("maliciously") in §594 imports a specific intent | People: §7 definition of maliciously imports basic wrongful intent, not specific intent | Moore: historical definition of malice shows a higher mental-state requirement (wanton, reckless) that intoxication could negate | The statutory/modern meaning under §7 does not require a specific intent; Atkins controls that "maliciously" does not create specific intent |
| Whether vandalism contains a specific-knowledge or mental-state element (like resisting arrest) | People: no specific knowledge element in §594 | Moore: intoxication could negate required mental state or knowledge | Court: §594 has no specific-knowledge element; intoxication admissible only where statute requires specific knowledge (not here) |
| Validity of probation conditions (warrantless searches; residence/employment approval) | Moore: these conditions are overbroad and unconstitutional (on appeal) | People: conditions were proper (trial court imposed standard conditions; Moore failed to object below) | Court: Moore forfeited his challenges by failing to object at sentencing; appellate review declined and judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Waidla, 22 Cal.4th 690 (de novo review of omitted jury instructions)
- People v. Atkins, 25 Cal.4th 76 (voluntary intoxication not a defense to arson; "maliciously" does not create specific intent)
- People v. Campbell, 23 Cal.App.4th 1488 (historical context of malicious injury statutes)
- People v. Watie, 100 Cal.App.4th 866 ("maliciously" under §7 contrasted with other definitions)
- People v. Reyes, 52 Cal.App.4th 975 (intoxication admissible to negate specific-knowledge element such as knowing an officer)
- People v. Lopez, 188 Cal.App.3d 592 (possession offenses where intoxication may negate knowledge)
- People v. Sekona, 27 Cal.App.4th 443 (crimes requiring malice under §7 treated as general intent)