People v. Mooney
124 N.E.3d 1068
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Mooney was charged (Feb 2, 2014) with driving while license suspended; counsel filed a speedy-trial demand on Aug 19, 2014, triggering a 160-day statutory clock that expired Jan 26, 2015.
- Trial was originally set for Oct 27, 2014; the State obtained a continuance then (attributable to the State).
- On Jan 5, 2015, counsel announced ready, but the case was continued because the State’s witness was unavailable; a written order from that date states the continuance was on defendant’s motion and that "defendant agrees that speedy is tolled."
- On Mar 24, 2015, the State tendered video discovery moments before trial; counsel requested a continuance and a written order again attributed the continuance to defendant and tolled speedy trial.
- Bench trial occurred Apr 21, 2015; Mooney was convicted and sentenced to probation.
- On appeal, Mooney argued defense counsel was ineffective for twice agreeing to continuances/tolling that caused the 160-day speedy-trial period to elapse; the court reversed the conviction outright on those grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense counsel’s agreements to continuances that tolled the speedy-trial clock constituted ineffective assistance | State did not contest applicability of ineffective-assistance review; argued first continuance was attributable to State and written orders reflected defendant’s agreement | Mooney argued counsel unreasonably agreed to toll speedy clock on Jan 5 and Mar 24 continuances that were factually attributable to the State, depriving him of statutory speedy trial | Court held counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial; reversed conviction outright |
| Whether the Jan 5, 2015 continuance was attributable to defendant | State relied on written order showing defendant agreed to toll | Mooney argued record shows counsel announced ready and delay was caused by State witness unavailability | Court held the record shows the delay was attributable to the State; counsel’s agreement to toll was objectively unreasonable |
| Whether the Mar 24, 2015 continuance was attributable to defendant | State pointed to defense motion/ written order | Mooney argued continuance was necessitated by State’s late tender of video discovery | Court treated the continuance as resulting from the State’s late discovery and concluded counsel should not have agreed to toll |
| Remedy for violation caused by counsel’s deficient acts | State implicitly argued orders showing defendant’s agreement foreclosed dismissal | Mooney sought dismissal because the 160-day clock had expired absent counsel’s agreements | Court applied precedent and reversed conviction outright as remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (no federal right to counsel where no imprisonment imposed)
- McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (right to effective assistance of counsel)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance)
- People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423 (trial outside statutory period mandates reversal)
- People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (defense agreement to continuance may be attributable to defendant)
- People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380 (defense counsel’s prior agreement can render a dismissal motion meritless)
- People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319 (applying Strickland prejudice standard)
- People v. Perkins, 90 Ill. App. 3d 975 (late State discovery can justify defense continuance without attributing delay to defendant)