People v. Molano
249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1
| Cal. | 2019Background
- In 1995 Suzanne (Sue) McKenna was found strangled in her cottage; biological evidence preserved but DNA testing was unavailable then. Defendant Carl Molano was later linked by DNA on the ligature and by witness ID; Molano admitted to sex with McKenna and to tying her garments around her neck, claiming the death was accidental during consensual "rough sex."
- Molano had prior sexual-violence convictions and a later admitted domestic strangulation of his wife; the prosecution introduced those acts as other-crimes evidence.
- Investigators interviewed Molano in San Quentin (March 21, 2003) after using a ruse (presenting as sex-offender/registration investigators); Molano waived Miranda, then invoked counsel and stopped the interview.
- Ten days later officers returned, Molano made unrecorded statements at the prison indicating he wanted to talk; during transport and at the station he again spoke and gave recorded statements, ultimately confessing he choked McKenna; he renewed Miranda waivers at the station. Molano moved to suppress; the trial court denied suppression.
- A jury convicted Molano of first-degree murder with a rape-murder special circumstance; the jury returned death. On appeal Molano challenged admissibility of his statements, admission of other-crimes evidence, instructional omissions about unreasonable mistake of consent, and penalty-phase issues. The California Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Molano) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Miranda waiver at initial San Quentin interview | Waiver valid despite officers' ruse; Molano heard full Miranda warnings and understood consequences | Waiver invalid because officers deceptively misrepresented purpose (sex-registration ruse), vitiating knowing/ voluntary waiver | Waiver valid: withholding the specific subject of questioning (ruse) did not invalidate waiver where Miranda warnings were given and understood (Moran/Spring principles) |
| Whether Molano reinitiated interrogation after invoking counsel (Edwards rule) | Molano reinitiated contact at prison (unrecorded statements) and later at station; prosecution met burden to show initiation and voluntary waiver | Molano invoked counsel and was re-badgered during transport; later station waiver therefore tainted by Edwards presumption | Trial court reasonably found Molano reinitiated and later knowingly waived; Edwards did not bar the station interrogation |
| Whether transport/car statements or officer "softening" rendered station waiver involuntary | Station waiver voluntary; officers did not coerce, and any car ambiguities were clarified at station with new Miranda advisals | Transport statements and softening-up (appeals to family, minimizing victim) coerced waiver; alternatively Molano made equivocal invocation in car that required cessation | Court found car remarks equivocal (not clear invocation), station advisal and Molano's recorded acknowledgments established voluntary waiver; softening-up insufficient to overbear will (Honeycutt distinguished) |
| Admission of other-crimes evidence and limiting instructions (Evid. Code §§1108,1101(b),352) | Prior rapes admissible under §1108; spousal assault admissible to prove intent/mistake/absence of accident; limiting instructions were given | Admission violates due process and §352; evidence too prejudicial and dissimilar | Admissions proper: sexual-offense evidence permitted by §1108; spousal assault relevant to intent and accident, and trial court reasonably exercised §352 discretion |
| Instructional duty re: unreasonable but good-faith mistake of consent (Mayberry/Flannel principle) | No sua sponte duty to instruct on an unreasonable-but-genuine belief in consent; omission forfeited and harmless | Court should have instructed that an honest but unreasonable belief negates specific intent required for rape-murder special circumstance | Forfeited (defense did not request); even if error, omission harmless given strong evidence of forcible rape, strangulation, and behavior after the killing |
| Penalty-phase prejudice from victim-impact testimony referencing sister’s suicide | Prosecutor did not intentionally elicit inadmissible suicide claim; court admonished and struck; no incurable prejudice | Testimony violated court order and was incurably prejudicial, warranting mistrial or reversal | No prosecutorial misconduct proven; court's admonitions cured any prejudice and denial of mistrial was within discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and waiver rule)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (post-invocation bar on further interrogation absent defendant initiation)
- Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (withholding information unrelated to core Miranda warnings does not vitiate waiver)
- Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (no requirement to disclose all possible subjects of questioning to preserve waiver)
- Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (14-day break-in-custody rule and limits of Edwards presumption)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (ambiguous/equivocal invocation of counsel does not require cessation)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (an implied waiver can be found from voluntary statements after Miranda)
- People v. Tate, 49 Cal.4th 635 (application of Spring principles in California)
- People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (Evidence Code §1108 and federal due process challenge rejected)
- People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal.3d 150 (softening-up and pre-warning persuasion can render waiver involuntary; distinguished on facts)