B290629A
Cal. Ct. App.Nov 2, 2020Background
- Defendant Emin Mirzakhanyan, diagnosed at Patton State Hospital with Bipolar Disorder, manic with psychotic features, was repeatedly opposed to taking psychotropic medication.
- April 17, 2017 (Lexus): after prior bans and an earlier arrest, he entered a dealership, violently damaged an LX 570 (>$28,000), damaged other vehicles, threatened to shoot people, and was arrested; charged with felony vandalism and misdemeanor trespass.
- May 25, 2017 (Altana): he threw a six-foot advertising sign into the street, jumped on it, attempted to enter a locked building, threw gravel that struck manager Mark Roe, made death threats to Roe and his family, and spat on a transporting officer; charged with felony vandalism, criminal threats, battery, and battery on a peace officer.
- Competency proceedings: initially found incompetent, treated at Patton, later restored and found competent; cases were consolidated; a jury convicted him of two felony vandalism counts and four misdemeanors; court sentenced him to a split county jail term and issued a three-year protective order under Penal Code §136.2.
- On appeal he contested (1) sufficiency of evidence for trespass and battery convictions, (2) entitlement to a hearing on mental health diversion under Penal Code §1001.36, (3) validity of the §136.2 protective order, and (4) calculation of presentence conduct credits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence — Trespass (count 2) | Prosecution: evidence showed he returned after being banned and intentionally entered to disrupt/damage business. | Mirzakhanyan: he only sought a car and became disruptive after being denied; no intent to interfere when he entered. | Affirmed. Jury reasonably inferred intent to injure/interfere from prior bans, recent arrest, and destructive conduct in showroom. |
| Sufficiency of evidence — Battery on Roe (count 5) | Prosecution: circumstantial and video evidence support that he knew workers were behind him and intentionally threw gravel. | Mirzakhanyan: he was not looking at Roe when he threw the gravel, so no willful battery. | Affirmed. Evidence supported that he knew Roe and others were behind him when he threw gravel; a rational jury could find willfulness. |
| Mental-health diversion eligibility (Pen. Code §1001.36) | People: historically argued diversion would be futile because defendant refused medication (trial court had denied probation). | Mirzakhanyan: sought remand for an eligibility hearing under the retroactive application of §1001.36. | Conditionally reversed and remanded. Under People v. Frahs, record diagnosis of bipolar disorder is a qualifying disorder warranting a limited remand for an eligibility hearing; no prediction made about ultimate eligibility or whether diversion must be granted. |
| Validity of §136.2 protective order | People: sought to uphold the three-year protective order; invoked court authority (citing Townsel). | Mirzakhanyan: §136.2 orders are prejudgment-only; court lacked authority to impose a postjudgment protective order under that statute. | Vacated. §136.2 orders are limited to the pendency of criminal proceedings; postjudgment protections must proceed under other statutory schemes; Townsel did not authorize a §136.2 postjudgment order here. |
| Presentence conduct credit calculation | People (conceded): trial court miscalculated credits for time at Patton; 12 days should be added. | Mirzakhanyan: entitled to additional conduct credits because only 30 of 42 hospital days were ineligible. | Remand/modify. Award additional 12 days of conduct credit for a total of 320 days; amend abstract if convictions/sentence are reinstated after diversion proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Frahs, 9 Cal.5th 618 (Supreme Court 2020) (mental-health diversion statute may be applied retroactively and supports conditional remand when record shows qualifying disorder)
- In re Wallace, 3 Cal.3d 289 (California 1970) (returning to property after refusal to leave does not automatically show intent to disrupt business)
- In re Ball, 23 Cal.App.3d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (deliberate reentry plus conduct that obstructs business supports inference of intent)
- People v. Ponce, 173 Cal.App.4th 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (§136.2 protective orders are prejudgment tools and may not be used to impose postjudgment restraining orders)
- Townsel v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1084 (California 1999) (courts have inherent power to protect jurors; not a basis to convert §136.2 to a postjudgment protective device)
- People v. Waterman, 42 Cal.3d 565 (California 1986) (generally no conduct credit for time in state hospital while incompetent)
- People v. Bryant, 174 Cal.App.4th 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (after competence is restored, defendant may get conduct credit for hospital time awaiting transfer to county jail)
- People v. Stone, 123 Cal.App.4th 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (vacatur of protective order that exceeds §136.2 authority)
- People v. Bolin, 18 Cal.4th 297 (California 1998) (standard for reversal for insufficient evidence is whether any reasonable hypothesis supports the verdict)
- People v. Lee, 51 Cal.4th 620 (California 2011) (deference to jury credibility determinations and viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict)