2022 COA 92
Colo. Ct. App.2022Background
- Miranda Moss was arrested on November 19, 2019, after police located the victim’s 2004 Ford Mustang; she pleaded guilty to aggravated motor vehicle theft and first-degree criminal trespass, with both counts alleging the offenses occurred "on or about November 19, 2019." Other charges were dismissed but could be considered for sentencing/restitution.
- The People sought $4,187.19 in restitution based on a repair estimate prepared eight months after officers recovered the vehicle.
- At a two-day restitution hearing, the district court found the People proved proximate cause only for towing and for two repairs (battery and transmission fluid replacement) and ordered $461.13 in restitution (the parties do not contest the $275 towing award).
- Moss appealed, arguing (1) the battery and transmission fluid replacement were not proximately caused by her and (2) she was not charged with or convicted of property-damage-related conduct and did not agree to restitution for such damage.
- The Court of Appeals held that restitution must be tied to defendant conduct occurring on the dates of the charged offense(s) (unless the parties expressly agree otherwise) and reversed the award for the battery and transmission fluid while affirming restitution for the towing cost.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether restitution may be ordered for losses not tied to the date(s) of the charged offense(s) | Restitution may compensate pecuniary losses proximately caused by the defendant’s misconduct even if loss occurred later; Moss’s possession over time supports award | Restitution must be tied to conduct on the date(s) alleged in the charges; she wasn’t charged/convicted for damage at other times | Court: Restitution must be tied to defendant’s conduct occurring on the charged date(s) unless parties expressly agreed otherwise; damages lacking a tie to Nov. 19, 2019 reversed |
| Whether the People proved proximate cause for battery and transmission fluid replacement by a preponderance of the evidence | The repairs were proximately caused by Moss’s unlawful possession | Insufficient evidence that those specific damages were caused on or about Nov. 19 | Court: Insufficient evidentiary link to show those repairs were proximately caused by conduct on the charged date; award reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010) (defines proximate cause for restitution as cause that in natural and probable sequence produced the claimed loss)
- Deeds v. People, 747 P.2d 1266 (Colo. 1987) (discusses permissible temporal variation for an "on or about" charged date)
- Lomax v. Cronin, 575 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1978) (addresses date-of-offense specificity and "on or about" language)
- People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580 (Colo. App. 2009) (standard for upholding district court findings on disputed factual issues)