People v. Mimes
352 Ill. Dec. 119
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Defendant Martell Mimes was convicted after a bench trial of attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and two counts of AUUW; concurrent sentences were imposed, including a 45-year term for attempted murder.
- The evidence showed defendant robbed and shot Lenard Richardson in a Chicago public housing lobby, with eight shell casings recovered from the scene all fired from the same gun.
- Richardson identified defendant as the shooter; defendant gave varying statements to police and did not testify at trial.
- The court admitted other-crimes evidence to aid identification, and the judge stated he weighed its probative value against any prejudice for identification purposes.
- Two AUUW convictions rested on separate bases (undercircumstances of public carrying and open-carry with gun uncased/loaded), while a concurrent aggravated battery with a firearm conviction arose from the same shooting.
- On appeal, defendant challenged the prosecutor-like conduct of the court, notice for sentence enhancement, the sentence length, one-act/one-crime violations, constitutionality of AUUW, and various fines/fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court improperly act as prosecutor by considering other-crimes evidence? | Mimes argues the judge improperly suggested admissibility and weighed other-crimes evidence sua sponte. | Mimes contends the court’s remarks indicated prosecutorial role and prejudice to defense. | No reversible error; no appearance of partiality; court clarified admissible purpose for identification. |
| Was the 25-year sentence enhancement improperly added without proper notice? | State contends notice complied with 111-3(c-5) and enhancement was properly applied. | Mimes argues lack of written pretrial notice of enhancement facts violated 111-3(c-5). | Notice sufficed; enhancement proper; prejudice not shown; indictment and notice together supported the enhancement. |
| Is the 45-year attempted murder sentence within permissible discretion and not excessive? | State argues substantial aggravating factors supported a lengthy sentence. | Mimes asserts rehabilitative potential and youth argued for a lesser sentence. | Not an abuse of discretion; 45 years within statutory range given aggravation and victim harm. |
| Do one-act, one-crime violations apply to the AUUW convictions and aggravated battery with a firearm? | State contends multiple convictions arise from distinct acts; some AUUW and aggravated battery overlap with the murder attempt. | Mimes asserts multiple convictions derive from a single act; some AUUW/aggravated battery should be vacated. | Aggravated battery with a firearm and one AUUW offense vacated as stemming from same act; remaining AUUW conviction sustained; another AUUW vacated as a second count. |
| Do the AUUW provisions violate the Second Amendment or Illinois Constitution? | State defends AUUW as a permissible public-safety restriction; Heller/McDonald guide heightened scrutiny. | Mimes contends ban on carrying uncased, loaded firearms in public violates fundamental rights. | AUUW facially constitutional; intermediate scrutiny applies; provision justified by public safety; not a violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Rowell, 229 Ill.2d 82 (2008) (pretrial notice sufficiency; elements and prejudice analysis)
- People v. Nash, 173 Ill.2d 423 (1996) (indictment sufficiency; prejudice standard when raised on appeal)
- People v. Davis, 217 Ill.2d 472 (2005) (indictment sufficiency and standard of review for posttrial challenges)
- People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill.2d 79 (2005) (indictment and prejudice; specificity requirements)
- People v. Aquino, 239 Ill.App.3d 12 (1992) (one-act, one-crime analysis; overlap between offenses)
- People v. Williams, 405 Ill.App.3d 958 (2010) (AUUW: rational basis vs. heightened scrutiny discussion)
- People v. Marin, 342 Ill.App.3d 716 (2003) (statutory purpose of AUUW; public safety rationale)
- People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136 (2011) (adoption of intermediate scrutiny for second amendment challenges to AUUW)
- Wilson v. Cook County, 407 Ill.App.3d 759 (2011) (two-part approach to second amendment challenges; scope and scrutiny)
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ( Second Amendment protects individual right to bear arms within home; limits on scope)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. _ (2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment against states via Fourteenth Amendment)