People v. Merriweather
2017 IL App (4th) 150407
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In June 2003 defendant Byron Merriweather (born June 1985) fatally shot Steven McDade; defendant was 17 at the time.
- A grand jury indicted him for first degree murder; a jury convicted in February 2006 and the trial court sentenced him in May 2006 to 70 years (45 years plus mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement).
- Merriweather’s direct appeal affirmed. He filed a pro se postconviction petition in 2008 alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; it was dismissed as frivolous and that dismissal was affirmed.
- In February 2013 Merriweather moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition claiming actual innocence based on new affidavits identifying another shooter; he later sought to supplement with an additional affidavit (Pike).
- The trial court denied leave in March 2015, finding the initial affidavits were not newly discovered; the court did not reference or rule on the Pike affidavit.
- On appeal Merriweather challenged (1) his sentence as a de facto life term under Miller and (2) the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition; the appellate court remanded for the trial court to rule on the motion to supplement with Pike’s affidavit and vacated the trial court’s denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Merriweather may raise an as‑applied Eighth Amendment challenge to his 70‑year sentence under Miller for the first time on appeal from the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition | The State: such as‑applied challenges raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited; Thompson requires development at the trial level | Merriweather: his 70‑year sentence is a de facto life sentence and unconstitutional as applied under Miller | Court: Forfeited — Merriweather cannot raise the as‑applied Miller claim for the first time on appeal; the proper vehicle is a successive postconviction petition where the trial court can develop the record |
| Whether the trial court erred by denying leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging actual innocence based on newly discovered affidavits | The State: the affidavits were not newly discovered and could have been developed prior to trial | Merriweather: new affidavits (including Pike) identify another shooter (Troy Wells/T‑Y) and establish actual innocence, warranting leave | Court: Remand — the trial court failed to address Merriweather’s motion to supplement with Pike’s affidavit; trial court must rule on the supplementation and then determine leave under the cause‑and‑prejudice / actual innocence standards |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (juvenile mandatory life without parole unconstitutional)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (new substantive rules must be given retroactive effect in collateral proceedings)
- People v. Thompson, 43 N.E.3d 984 (Illinois Supreme Court: as‑applied Eighth Amendment challenges can be forfeited if raised first on appeal; trial court must develop record)
- People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Miller created a new substantive rule; retroactivity in Illinois)
- People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941 (standards for successive postconviction petitions and actual innocence exception)
- People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829 (actual innocence standard to excuse procedural default)
