People v. Mercado
2025 IL App (4th) 240448-U
Ill. App. Ct.2025Background
- Juan Martin Mercado was charged with criminal sexual assault against a minor, whom he was accused of abusing while in a position of trust.
- Mercado was arrested on February 12, 2022, and remained in continuous custody throughout the proceedings.
- Several continuances were requested during the pretrial period, most by defense counsel, though Mercado filed multiple pro se demands objecting to these delays and requested a speedy trial.
- Mercado changed attorneys several times and ultimately requested to proceed pro se, reiterating his demand for a speedy trial and seeking dismissal based on alleged speedy trial violations.
- The trial court denied Mercado’s motion for discharge, attributing the delays to him due to his attorneys’ approval of continuances, and Mercado was convicted at trial and sentenced to 10 years in prison.
- On appeal, Mercado argued that the trial court erred by attributing defense-requested delays to him despite his repeated demands for a speedy trial and objections to continuances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff’s Argument | Defendant’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Violation of statutory speedy trial rights | Delays due to defense counsel are chargeable to Mercado | Mercado should not be bound by counsel’s continuances after his speedy trial demands and attorney discharges | Continuances remained attributable to Mercado; no violation found |
| 2. Effect of objections to continuances by counsel | Counsel may make strategic decisions about continuances | A defendant’s specific objections and intent to fire counsel should override counsel’s agreement | Objection alone does not sever attorney-client alignment unless counsel is discharged and defendant proceeds pro se |
| 3. Appropriateness of analogizing to Pearson and Hilliard | Defendant never unequivocally discharged counsel until late October 2023 | Mercado’s repeated demands and objections equate to those cases and toll the clock | Pearson/Hilliard distinguishable; Mercado did not timely discharge counsel |
| 4. Calculation of speedy trial clock | State attributed 83 + 33 = 116 days to itself | Defendant argued over 120 days elapsed when accounting for objections/attorney firings | Total days attributed to the State did not exceed 120 days |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Pearson, 88 Ill. 2d 210 (Ill. 1981) (defense counsel’s continuance not attributable to defendant only if defendant clearly/convincingly seeks to discharge counsel and proceed pro se)
- People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131 (Ill. 1990) (attorney may make procedural/strategic decisions, binding the defendant)
- People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530 (Ill. 2002) (defendant not bound by counsel’s actions only when unequivocally asserts right to discharge counsel and proceed pro se)
- People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380 (Ill. 2006) (statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights are not coextensive)