People v. Melvin
2015 IL App (2d) 131005
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- James Melvin pleaded guilty to attempted predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (a Class 1 felony) pursuant to a plea agreement that called for a 60-year sentence (Class X extended-term).
- The State explained the sentence was based on two prior felonies: a prior Class X predatory criminal sexual assault (1998) and a prior Class 2 felony (1996), which the State said elevated Melvin to Class X and then to an extended-term.
- The agreed 60-year term exceeded the nonextended Class X maximum (30 years) and was premised on using the prior Class X felony twice: once to elevate penalty to Class X and again to authorize an extended term.
- Melvin filed a postconviction petition arguing the 60-year sentence was void as a product of double enhancement; the trial court denied leave to file a second petition.
- The appellate court considered whether the sentence was statutorily authorized or void due to double enhancement and whether the plea/judgment must be vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 60-year sentence is void as a double enhancement | The prior Class X was used only to enhance punishment, not the offense class, so no double enhancement | The prior Class X was used twice: to raise to Class X and then to authorize an extended-term, constituting double enhancement | Vacated: sentence is void because the same prior conviction was used to enhance punishment twice |
| Whether Thomas prevents treating the second use of priors as an enhancement | Thomas permits judicial reliance on priors in aggravation without creating an unlawful enhancement | Melvin: Thomas is distinguishable because Thomas’s sentence remained within the single enlarged range; here sentence required a second statutory enlargement to reach 60 years | Court distinguishes Thomas: here the 60-year term required a second statutory increase, so Thomas does not save the sentence |
| Whether the court may impose the agreed 60-year term despite plea agreement | State argues the plea agreement reflects the parties’ intent and should stand | Melvin: court cannot impose an unauthorized sentence even by agreement | Court: unauthorized sentence cannot stand; plea agreement vacated because agreement depends on void term |
| Remedy: reduce sentence vs vacate plea | State may prefer remand or accept plea with lawful 30-year term | Melvin seeks relief (vacatur/remand) or reduction to 30 years | Court vacates judgment and remands; offers option for State to accept plea for 30-year sentence by petition for rehearing to avoid remand |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207 (1996) (defines double enhancement and explains judicial aggravation within an authorized range is not an enhancement)
- People v. Milka, 336 Ill. App. 3d 206 (2003) (explains double enhancement when same factor is used to enhance twice; affirmed on other grounds)
- People v. Griham, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1169 (2010) (double enhancement where same prior felony increased offense class and then triggered Class X sentencing)
- People v. Hare, 315 Ill. App. 3d 606 (2000) (unauthorized sentence cannot be saved by plea agreement)
- People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19 (2004) (void judgments may be attacked in any court with jurisdiction)