People v. Melecio
2017 IL App (1st) 141434
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Jose Melecio was indicted on multiple counts arising from the November 8, 2009 killing of Carlos Aguirre; charges included intentional murder, other first‑degree theories, and vehicular invasion (entered vehicle "with intent to commit first degree murder").
- The State nol‑prossed the counts that expressly cited the felony‑murder statute prior to trial but nonetheless proposed felony‑murder jury instructions; defense counsel made no on‑the‑record objection to those instructions.
- At trial the prosecution relied on eyewitness statements (a pretrial signed statement by the decedent’s girlfriend, Maria Reyes, and trial testimony from acquaintances), fingerprints on the vehicle, and post‑shooting conduct; no gun was recovered. The jury returned general guilty verdicts for first‑degree murder and vehicular invasion.
- The trial court entered judgment for intentional first‑degree murder (mittimus reflected 720 ILCS 5/9‑1(a)(1)) and imposed 55 years (including a firearm enhancement), then imposed a consecutive 10‑year sentence for vehicular invasion.
- On appeal Melecio argued (inter alia) that giving felony‑murder instructions after nol‑prossing felony‑murder counts undermined the judicial process, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, the vehicular‑invasion predicate lacked an independent felonious purpose (Morgan doctrine), and one‑act/one‑crime barred the separate vehicular‑invasion conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Melecio) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether giving felony‑murder instructions after nol‑prossing felony‑murder counts was reversible error | No reversible error; a felony‑murder instruction may be given even if not charged and a general verdict is presumed to be for the most serious theory | Instruction allowed conviction on impermissible basis (felony murder impermissible because predicate felony—vehicular invasion—was committed with intent to murder) | Court applied Morgan presumption that a general guilty verdict is for the most serious offense (intentional murder); any error in felony‑murder instruction did not deprive defendant of a fair trial; conviction for murder affirmed |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to felony‑murder instructions | State: forfeiture applies; no prejudice because verdict presumed for intentional murder | Failure to object was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because felony‑murder would preclude conviction/sentence on predicate felony | Court rejected ineffective‑assistance claim in light of Morgan presumption and lack of showing that the jury convicted on felony murder |
| Whether vehicular‑invasion conviction must be vacated under one‑act/one‑crime or because it was merely a step of the murder | State: invasion and killing are separate acts; distinct elements justify separate convictions and consecutive sentence | Vehicular invasion (charged as entry with intent to commit murder) was inherent in the murder and thus cannot support a separate conviction/sentence | Court vacated the vehicular‑invasion conviction under one‑act/one‑crime reasoning and because Smith/Morgan implications meant felony‑murder treatment would have precluded the predicate offense; murder conviction and sentence affirmed |
| Admissibility / Confrontation: prior inconsistent statements and witnesses’ failure of present recollection | Statements admissible under 725 ILCS 5/115‑10.1; witnesses were available for cross‑examination | Admission violated confrontation or statutory foundation because witnesses lacked present recollection | Court found statutory foundation and availability for cross satisfied; no clear or obvious Crawford error |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (supra) (predicate felony for felony murder must have an independent felonious purpose; but where multiple murder theories are submitted with a general verdict, presume jury convicted of most serious offense)
- People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (supra) (where general verdict returns guilt on multiple murder theories, presume conviction for intentional murder; procedural rule about separate verdict forms when sentencing consequences differ)
- People v. Hines, 257 Ill. App. 3d 238 (supra) (reversal required where jury instruction possibly allowed conviction on an impermissible basis)
- People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (supra) (plain error doctrine described: two‑prong test for review of unpreserved errors)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial out‑of‑court statements admissible only if witness unavailable or defendant had prior opportunity to cross‑examine)