36 Cal.App.5th 859
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- In 1994 Fernando Vargas Mejia pleaded guilty to three felony drug counts and received probation with a 120-day jail term; plea form included a generic immigration advisement and the plea was entered "straight up" to the court.
- Mejia is a noncitizen who had lived in the U.S. since age 14, with wife and U.S.-born children; the convictions carry mandatory deportation under federal law.
- In 2017 Mejia filed a Penal Code §1473.7 motion to vacate his convictions, asserting he did not meaningfully understand or knowingly accept the immigration consequences of his plea.
- The trial court denied the motion analyzing the claim under Strickland ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) standards and found Mejia had not shown he would have declined the plea.
- While the appeal was pending, the Legislature amended §1473.7 to clarify that a legal-invalidity finding "may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel," and the amendment was treated as retroactive.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding a movant must show by a preponderance that (1) he did not meaningfully understand or knowingly accept the immigration consequences and (2) had he understood them, it is reasonably probable he would have tried to defend against the charges (i.e., would not have pleaded). Mejia met that standard and was entitled to withdraw his pleas.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1473.7 requires proof of ineffective assistance of counsel | AG: Under prior interpretation, relief requires IAC proof; here Mejia wouldn’t meet Strickland prejudice prong | Mejia: Amendment allows relief without proving IAC; focus is defendant’s own lack of understanding and prejudice | The amended §1473.7 does not require IAC; defendant need only prove prejudicial error damaging his ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept immigration consequences |
| Standard for "prejudicial error" under §1473.7 | AG: Court should evaluate under Strickland prejudice test (reasonable probability of different outcome) | Mejia: Prejudice defined by whether defendant would have declined plea and risked trial if aware of immigration consequences | Prejudicial error shown by preponderance when defendant did not understand consequences and there is a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea and defended against the charges |
| Proper evidence to assess defendant’s claim of lack of understanding | AG: Court may consider contemporaneous circumstances and likelihood of conviction to infer he would have accepted plea | Mejia: Testimony and contemporaneous factors (ties to U.S., plea type, weak prosecution evidence) support that he would not have pleaded | Court must consider defendant’s own testimony plus contemporaneous evidence; they found Mejia’s circumstances substantiated prejudice |
| Remedy when §1473.7 relief established | AG: If no IAC, courts should still be cautious about vacating long-final convictions | Mejia: Vacatur and ability to withdraw plea is appropriate remedy | When movant meets §1473.7 by preponderance, court must grant motion and allow withdrawal of plea; remand for that relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective assistance of counsel two-prong test)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (Counsel must advise noncitizen defendants of deportation risk of plea)
- Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (Showing reasonable probability defendant would have rejected plea because of deportation)
- People v. Camacho, 32 Cal.App.5th 998 (Interpreting amended §1473.7: relief may be based on defendant’s own error without proving IAC)
- In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122 (Plea procedures: knowing, intelligent waiver and advisals)