PEOPLE v. McKINLEY
496 Mich. 410
| Mich. | 2014Background
- Defendant was tried for thefts of commercial air-conditioning units; convicted of malicious destruction of property, inducing a minor to commit a felony, and larceny over $20,000 (one conviction later vacated on appeal).
- At sentencing the trial court reserved restitution and later ordered $158,180.44, comprising $63,749.44 tied to convicted offenses and $94,431 based solely on uncharged thefts attributed to the defendant by an accomplice.
- Defendant objected at the restitution hearing only to the portion based on uncharged conduct (arguing it needed proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
- Court of Appeals affirmed convictions (vacating one larceny count) and upheld the restitution award; this Court granted leave limited to whether restitution is a criminal penalty and whether statutes permit restitution based on uncharged conduct without jury proof.
- Supreme Court majority overruled People v Gahan insofar as it allowed restitution based solely on uncharged conduct, holding MCL 780.766(2) authorizes restitution only to victims of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction (i.e., conduct causally tied to the convicted offense).
- The Court vacated the $94,431 portion of restitution and remanded to enter $63,749.44 in restitution; it declined to decide the Sixth Amendment/Apprendi constitutional questions under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether restitution is equivalent to a criminal penalty such that Apprendi applies | (Plaintiff/prosecution) Implicitly treated restitution as civil/rehabilitative and within statutory authority; did not press that restitution is a criminal penalty here | (McKinley) Argued Apprendi may limit restitution based on facts not found by a jury | Court declined to resolve this constitutional question (avoided) |
| Whether MCL 780.766(2) authorizes restitution based on uncharged conduct | Prosecution: restitution may compensate victims of the defendant’s broader course of criminal conduct | McKinley: restitution based on uncharged conduct is improper absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Held: MCL 780.766(2) does not authorize restitution based solely on uncharged conduct; such awards vacated |
| Proper statutory interpretation of phrase "course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction" | Prosecution relied on broader reading (Gahan) allowing related uncharged acts within same scheme | McKinley argued uncharged conduct cannot ‘‘give rise to’’ a conviction without being charged and proved | Held: "gives rise to" requires causal link to the convicted offense; uncharged, unconvicted conduct cannot serve as the sole basis for restitution |
| Whether People v Gahan should be followed | Prosecution relied on Gahan precedent permitting restitution to victims of the defendant’s entire illegal scheme | McKinley sought to limit or overrule Gahan to prevent restitution for uncharged acts | Held: Gahan overruled to the extent it permitted restitution solely for uncharged conduct; overruling justified by statutory text and stare decisis analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264 (Mich. 1997) (previously held restitution could reach victims of the defendant’s broader course of conduct)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment rule on facts increasing punishment)
- Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012) (Apprendi-related sentencing principles)
- Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (interpreting "as a result of" to require causation in restitution contexts)
- Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (federal restitution limited to losses caused by the offense of conviction)