People v. McKenzie CA2/6
B319489
Cal. Ct. App.Apr 26, 2023Background
- Defendant Antwan McKenzie (then 30) frequently texted S.E., a 15‑year‑old who babysat his children; McKenzie was married to the girl’s aunt.
- Texts included sexual invitations, offers of money, requests to delete messages, photos, and entreaties to kiss and meet in a Jacuzzi; the victim complained to police.
- Police recovered the messages; McKenzie was convicted by jury of contacting a minor with intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3(a)) based on intent to commit a lewd act (§ 288(c)(1)); jury also found abuse of a position of trust.
- Trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed McKenzie on two years formal probation with 200 days in county jail and lifetime sex‑offender registration (§ 290).
- McKenzie appealed, arguing (1) he should have been prosecuted under the special misdemeanor statute (§ 647.6) per In re Williamson, (2) the offense should have been treated as a wobbler/misdemeanor under § 17(b) and his counsel was ineffective for not seeking that at sentencing, and (3) lifetime registration violates equal protection.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | McKenzie’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Williamson preemption requires treating the conduct under § 647.6 (misdemeanor) rather than § 288.3 (felony) | §288.3 applies to specific‑intent communications intending enumerated sex crimes; Williamson doesn’t preempt because elements differ and electorate intended §288.3 to protect children from internet predators | Williamson requires that where a special statute (§647.6) covers the same conduct it supersedes the general felony statute, so crime should be a misdemeanor | Rejected Williamson claim: elements and mental state differ; applying Williamson would nullify §288.3, and electorally adopted §288.3 shows intent for felony treatment. |
| Whether the offense is a wobbler / trial court should have reduced to misdemeanor; ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to request reduction | §288.3 prescribes felony punishment; no statutory authorization to reduce to misdemeanor; counsel not ineffective for omitting meritless request | Trial court should have exercised discretion to treat as a misdemeanor under §17(b); counsel ineffective for failing to request reduction at sentencing | Forfeited because defense didn’t request reduction at sentencing; on merits §288.3 is a straight felony and reduction is not authorized; no ineffective assistance. |
| Whether lifetime sex‑offender registration violates equal protection | Different target offenses and age differentials produce meaningful distinctions; lifetime registration rationally related to protecting children from predators | Lifetime registration for §288.3 (based on intended §288(c)(1)) is disparate compared to other §288.3 predicates that carry shorter registration terms | Rejected equal protection claim: defendants are not similarly situated given victim/defendant age differences and offense severity; lifetime registration has a rational basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Williamson, 43 Cal.2d 651 (establishes Williamson preemption rule for special vs general statutes)
- People v. Murphy, 52 Cal.4th 81 (explains Williamson tests and statutory‑elements/context inquiry)
- Hudson v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.App.5th 999 (notes Williamson inapplicable when felony requires greater mental state)
- People v. Fromuth, 2 Cal.App.5th 91 (discusses §647.6 as a general‑intent offense)
- People v. Weddington, 246 Cal.App.4th 468 (forfeiture of wobbler reduction claim when not raised at sentencing)
- People v. Korwin, 36 Cal.App.5th 682 (context on Prop. 83/§288.3’s purpose to combat sexual predators)
- People v. Terry, 47 Cal.App.4th 329 (punishment specified determines felony/misdemeanor when statute silent)
- People v. Mauch, 163 Cal.App.4th 669 (court cannot reduce straight felony to misdemeanor absent statutory authorization)
- People v. Keister, 198 Cal.App.4th 442 (equal protection requires similarly situated comparison)
- Legg v. Dept. of Justice, 81 Cal.App.5th 504 (age differential can be a meaningful distinction supporting registration)
- Johnson v. Dept. of Justice, 60 Cal.4th 871 (rational‑basis review accepts rough legislative classifications)
