People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424

Background

In 2002 McFadden (then 17) pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) from a multi-count indictment; record does not specify which AUUW subsection or the plea factual basis. He later received other felony convictions.
In 2008 McFadden was charged with multiple armed robberies and two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUW by a felon), the latter alleging a prior AUUW felony (02CR30903) as the predicate.
At the 2008 bench trial McFadden stipulated that he had been previously convicted of AUUW (case 02CR30903); the trial court convicted him of three armed robberies and one surviving UUW-by-a-felon count (one UUW was vacated on one-act/one-crime grounds).
On appeal the First District vacated the remaining UUW-by-a-felon conviction because the predicate AUUW statute subsection had been declared facially unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a prior felony later held void ab initio may still serve to prove felon status for UUW by a felon, and whether resentencing was required on the armed-robbery terms.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (McFadden)	Held
Whether a prior felony conviction later declared facially unconstitutional (void ab initio) may nevertheless be used to prove the predicate felony for a UUW-by-a-felon charge	The UUW-by-a-felon statute is a status offense; it requires proof only that the defendant "has been convicted" of a felony at the time of possession, so an outstanding judgment (not yet vacated) suffices	The prior AUUW conviction is void ab initio under Aguilar and therefore cannot serve as a valid predicate felony to support a later UUW-by-a-felon conviction	The court held the prior conviction properly served as proof of felon status for UUW-by-a-felon because the statute looks to status at the time of possession and a conviction remains effective until vacated; affirmed UUW conviction
Whether McFadden’s 29‑year concurrent armed‑robbery sentences require remand for resentencing because the allegedly invalid 2002 AUUW conviction influenced punishment	People argued the record shows the 2002 AUUW conviction played little or no determinative role in sentencing, and other extensive criminal history and crime facts supported the sentence	McFadden argued that, absent the 2002 AUUW conviction, the trial court may have imposed lesser sentences and that resentencing or reduction is required	The court held resentencing was unnecessary because the record did not show the vacated AUUW conviction significantly affected sentencing; cross-appeal denied

Key Cases Cited

Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (federal felon‑in‑possession statute treats prior conviction as status that persists until vacated; collateral attack disallowed in subsequent federal prosecution)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons as presumptively lawful)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (reiterating that Heller did not cast doubt on longstanding firearm regulations, including felon prohibitions)
People v. Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317 (2004) (under Illinois law, UUW-by-a-felon requires proof only of the defendant’s felon status)
People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384 (1990) (void ab initio doctrine: facially unconstitutional statutes are unenforceable and convictions under them are subject to vacatur)
Perlstein v. Wolk, 218 Ill. 2d 448 (2006) (discussion of the meaning and limits of the void ab initio doctrine)
People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455 (2005) (stipulations constitute conclusive agreements that dispense with proof of the stipulated facts)