People v. McClenton
89 N.E.3d 798
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Defendant Mivan McClenton was convicted in 1997 of unlawful restraint (a crime then classified as a "sex offense" under SORA) and later convicted in 2001 for failing to register under SORA. He had additional felony convictions in 2011 and 2012.
- A 2014 grand jury indicted McClenton for failing to register in January–February 2014 (providing false address information and failing to notify change of address), in violation of SORA sections 3 and 6.
- In 2006 SORA was amended so that unlawful restraint counts as a "sex offense" only if the sentencing court found the offense was "sexually motivated." McClenton argued due process required dismissal because his 1997 sentencing court made no such finding.
- The trial court dismissed the 2014 indictment on due process grounds and ordered the Illinois State Police sex offender registration unit to remove McClenton from the registry.
- The State appealed; the appellate court reversed, holding the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment and lacked authority to order removal from the registry, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2006 SORA amendment retroactively eliminated defendant's status on the sex-offender registry and required dismissal | State: the 2006 amendment does not automatically remove someone who met SORA's definition at the time of conviction; the statute is not self-executing | McClenton: retroactive application of the 2006 amendment means he should not be treated as a sex offender absent a sexual-motivation finding; due process requires dismissal | Held: Amendment does not automatically expunge prior registrants; Johnson controls—no automatic removal; dismissal on due-process grounds was erroneous |
| Whether the indictment was legally sufficient under section 114-1(a)(8) | State: indictment properly pleads name, statute, facts, date, and county | McClenton (raised for first time on appeal): indictment failed to state an offense | Held: Indictment met statutory requirements and sufficiently alleged the offenses; dismissal for insufficiency reversed |
| Whether the trial court had authority to order the Illinois State Police to remove defendant from the registry | State: trial court lacked statutory authority to order administrative removal | McClenton: trial court's order should be upheld (or appellate court should not reach it) | Held: Trial court lacked authority; its order directing removal is reversed along with dismissal because the two directives were intertwined and appealable under Rule 604(a)(1) |
| Proper remedy/process for registrants affected by 2006 amendment | State: relief, if any, is statutory and administrative (e.g., transfer provision) rather than retroactive judicial removal | McClenton: seeks judicial relief via dismissal and registry removal | Held: Relief must follow statutory scheme; Johnson and the statutory transfer/administrative mechanisms control; courts cannot unilaterally remove names absent statutory authority |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573 (2007) (amended SORA does not self-execute to remove prior registrants; statutory transfer/administrative process governs)
- People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495 (2006) (discusses SORA extensions for failure to register)
- People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298 (1995) (motion to dismiss tests sufficiency of charging instrument, not evidence)
- People v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278 (2010) (orders may be interdependent and not severable for appealability analysis)