2021 IL App (2d) 200603
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Defendant Gary K. Mayfield was arrested Feb. 16, 2020 and initially had a trial date of Apr. 27, 2020; the Illinois Speedy Trial Act requires trial within 120 days of custody.
- In March–May 2020 the Illinois Supreme Court issued emergency pandemic orders authorizing chief judges to continue trials and stating continuances under those orders are excluded from speedy-trial calculations; the Lake County chief judge issued administrative orders implementing those directives.
- Defendant demanded trial on June 1, 2020; the trial court continued the case several times (August dates disputed), and defendant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the 120-day term on Aug. 11, 2020.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on Aug. 31, 2020, held a bench trial Sept. 9, 2020, and convicted Mayfield of domestic battery; Mayfield appealed claiming the trial was untimely and that the Supreme Court exceeded its authority in tolling the Act.
- The appellate court rejected Mayfield’s timeliness calculation (holding tolling under the Supreme Court and county orders began earlier than he claimed) and upheld the Supreme Court’s constitutional authority to allow tolling in response to the pandemic.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant was tried within the 120-day Speedy Trial Act period when pandemic continuances are accounted for | State: Supreme Court and Lake County administrative orders tolled speedy-trial time, so the trial began within 120 days | Mayfield: The tolling began later; counting resumed Aug. 3 and trial started after 120 days (total 123 days) | Court: Tolling under the supreme court and county orders applied earlier than Mayfield claimed; trial was timely |
| Whether the Illinois Supreme Court exceeded its authority or violated separation of powers by tolling the Speedy Trial Act during COVID-19 | State: Court procedures and scheduling fall under the Supreme Court’s primary constitutional authority; tolling was an exercise of supervisory power | Mayfield: Tolling suspends statute and improperly intrudes on legislative power | Court: Supreme Court had authority to toll/allow continuances under its supervisory power over courts; orders did not unlawfully usurp legislative power |
Key Cases Cited
- Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519 (1997) (explains the Supreme Court’s primary constitutional authority over court procedure and that court rules prevail over conflicting legislation on procedural matters)
- Newlin v. People, 221 Ill. 166 (1906) (addressed judge illness and held statutory speedy-trial protections are absolute absent statutory exceptions; distinguished by the court here)
- Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381 (1998) (articulates limits on judicial lawmaking and separation-of-powers principles relied on by defendant)
- People ex rel. Sheppard v. Money, 124 Ill. 2d 265 (1988) (describes when legislative procedures affecting court actions are permissible if they do not conflict with court rules)
- Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (Jackson dissent quoted for the principle that constitutional rights should not be interpreted to require self-destructive governmental action in emergencies)