513 P.3d 190
Cal.2022Background
- Defendant Tupoutoe Mataele was convicted of first-degree murder (Johnson), attempted murder (Masubayashi), and conspiracy; jury found lying-in-wait special circumstance and firearm and prior-serious-felony enhancements; sentenced to death.
- Shooting occurred Nov. 11–12, 1997; accomplices included Carrillo (prosecution witness who pleaded to reduced charges) and others; key eyewitnesses included Masubayashi, Carrillo, Fowler, Rodriguez, and unavailable Towne.
- Towne, a bystander, told police shortly after the shooting he saw a thin shooter; he was unavailable at the guilt phase but located before the penalty phase. Trial court excluded Towne’s live penalty-phase testimony as improperly relitigating guilt; defense sought to present it as lingering-doubt evidence.
- Defense argued Carrillo (much smaller build) — not Mataele (300+ lbs.) — was the shooter; prosecution relied on Carrillo’s testimony implicating Mataele and other incriminating statements/evidence.
- After penalty trial the jury returned a death verdict. Supreme Court of California affirmed convictions but remanded solely for the trial court to consider newly granted discretion to strike firearm and prior-serious-felony enhancements under recent Senate Bills.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Mataele) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excusal of two prospective jurors for cause based on death-penalty views | Trial court properly excused jurors who were equivocal and whose views would substantially impair duties | Excusal violated Witherspoon/Witt; denied impartial jury | Court: excusals supported by record; trial court discretion affirmed under substantial-impairment standard |
| Validity of substantial-impairment standard for excusing jurors | Standard is binding federal precedent and balances state and defendant interests | Standard conflicts with historical Sixth Amendment interpretation | Court: Witt/related U.S. Supreme Court precedent controls; no federal or state constitutional violation |
| Exclusion of Towne’s hearsay statements (spontaneous-statement exception) for guilt-phase | Statements were not spontaneous (interviewed 5–10 minutes later, in response to questioning); exclusion proper | Statements were spontaneous and admissible to show shooter thin build | Court: exclusion affirmed as within trial court’s broad discretion |
| Exclusion of Towne’s live testimony at penalty phase (lingering doubt) | Testimony would relitigate guilt and thus was inadmissible at penalty phase | Testimony admissible as lingering-doubt evidence under Penal Code §190.3 and Terry/Gay | Court: exclusion was error under state law (lingering doubt admissible) but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; penalty affirmed |
| Admission of hearsay (Perdon’s statement) and failure to give confession instruction | Admission as party-opponent / prior inconsistent statement was proper; CALJIC No.2.71 (admissions) sufficed | Admission violated hearsay rules; court should have given CALJIC No.2.70 caution on confessions | Court: admission proper (Perdon evasive → prior inconsistent); failure to give CALJIC No.2.70 harmless because CALJIC No.2.71 and other credibility instructions covered cautioning jury |
| Sufficiency of evidence for lying-in-wait special circumstance | Evidence showed concealment, watchful waiting, surprise attack | Insufficient to prove lying-in-wait | Court: evidence sufficient to support lying-in-wait special circumstance |
| Newly conferred discretion under SB 620 and SB 1393 to strike enhancements | Remand unnecessary; trial court indicated it would not strike | Remand needed so trial court can exercise new discretion to strike firearm and prior-serious-felony enhancements | Court: remand limited to allow trial court to consider whether to strike the enhancements; judgment otherwise affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1968) (prospective jurors cannot be excluded merely for general opposition to death penalty)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1985) (proper standard: whether prospective juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair duties)
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2007) (trial court’s deference in assessing juror demeanor; reaffirms substantial-impairment standard)
- People v. Gay, 42 Cal.4th 1195 (Cal. 2008) (lingering-doubt evidence admissible at penalty phase; relevance analysis)
- People v. Terry, 61 Cal.2d 137 (Cal. 1964) (lingering doubt admissible in mitigation at penalty phase)
- People v. Schultz, 10 Cal.5th 623 (Cal. 2020) (discussion of juror excusal and Witherspoon/Witt standards)
- People v. Jones, 54 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2012) (trial court’s juror-bias determinations reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Salazar, 63 Cal.4th 214 (Cal. 2016) (instructions on reasonable doubt/degree; reviewing instruction context as whole)
- People v. Combs, 34 Cal.4th 821 (Cal. 2004) (elements of lying-in-wait special circumstance)