People v. Mary H.
5 Cal. App. 5th 246
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Mary H. was detained for psychiatric evaluation under Welf. & Inst. Code §5150 after a drug overdose and statements she intended to kill herself; KMC diagnosed severe major depressive disorder and staff opined she was likely to harm herself.
- As a result of the §5150 detention, California law prohibited Mary from owning, possessing, receiving, or purchasing firearms for five years under §8103(f)(1).
- Mary petitioned the Kern County Superior Court to lift the firearm prohibition; the People introduced her medical records and Mary testified denying psychiatric problems and characterizing the overdose as accidental.
- The superior court denied relief, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Mary would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner and concluding she remained a danger to herself and others.
- Mary appealed, raising challenges to (1) the constitutionality of the preponderance standard in §8103(f)(6), (2) vagueness of the statutory phrase “would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner,” (3) sufficiency of the evidence, and (4) entitlement to appointed counsel on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appealability of the superior court order | The People argued the order denying the one‑time §8103(f) petition is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding | Mary implicitly argued appealability was questionable but proceeded on merits | Court: Order is appealable under Knoll as a final judgment in a special proceeding |
| Standard of proof required under §8103(f)(6) | People defended the statute's preponderance standard as constitutional given governmental interest in public safety | Mary argued due process and Second Amendment rights require clear and convincing evidence (citing Heller/McDonald) | Court: Preponderance of the evidence is constitutional for §8103(f)(6); balancing of private interest, risk of error, and government interest supports it |
| Vagueness of phrase “would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner” | People argued the phrase is common language that gives adequate notice and guidance | Mary argued the phrase is too vague, allowing arbitrary enforcement and chilling rights | Court: Phrase is not unconstitutionally vague; words are of common usage and guided by context and existing standards |
| Sufficiency of evidence to deny petition | People relied on medical records showing repeated suicide attempts, hospitalization, diagnosis, and professional opinion of risk | Mary relied on her testimony denying psychiatric issues and minimizing the incident | Court: Substantial evidence supports denial—record shows multiple prior attempts, severe diagnosis, and medical opinion that risk could recur |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (right to possess firearms in the home for self‑defense affirmed)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (Second Amendment incorporated against the states)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (standard‑of‑proof framework for civil commitment proceedings)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (clear and convincing evidence required for termination of parental rights)
- Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (appointment of counsel in civil cases depends on liberty interest and case‑by‑case balancing)
- Knoll v. Davidson, 12 Cal.3d 335 (appealability from final judgments in special proceedings)
- Jason K. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal.App.4th 1545 (upholding preponderance standard for §8103(f)(6))
- People v. Keil, 161 Cal.App.4th 34 (discussing §5150 detention consequences)
- Rupf v. Yan, 85 Cal.App.4th 411 (mental‑illness‑related firearm regulation rationale)
- People v. Redmond, 71 Cal.2d 745 (standard for substantial‑evidence review)