People v. Martinez
57 Cal. 4th 555
| Cal. | 2013Background
- In 1992 Rodrigo Martinez (a Mexican citizen) pleaded guilty to sale/transportation of marijuana pursuant to a plea bargain; the court record did not show the Penal Code §1016.5 immigration advisement was given, so it was presumed omitted.
- He received probation and later successfully completed it; the conviction was later expunged under §1203.4 but federal immigration consequences remained, and Martinez faced removal and denial of adjustment of status.
- In 2011 Martinez moved under §1016.5 to vacate his 1992 plea, claiming that, had he been warned about deportation/exclusion/denial of naturalization, he would have rejected the plea and either negotiated an immigration-neutral plea or gone to trial.
- At the §1016.5 hearing the trial court considered only whether Martinez would probably have obtained a more favorable outcome by rejecting the plea; it denied relief as it found a better outcome was unlikely. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether prejudice under §1016.5 turns on what the defendant would have done or on whether a more favorable outcome was likely, and (2) whether rejecting a plea to seek a different plea (not just to go to trial) can constitute prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What is the proper prejudice test under §1016.5? | State: prejudice requires showing a reasonable probability the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have obtained a more favorable outcome (i.e., likely better result). | Martinez: prejudice is shown if it is reasonably probable he would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised (regardless of whether a better result would likely follow). | Held: Prejudice focuses on what the defendant would have done; relief may be granted if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have rejected the plea, even if a better outcome was not reasonably probable. |
| Can a defendant show prejudice by proving he would have sought or accepted a different, immigration-neutral plea (not only by insisting on trial)? | State: relief should require proving a reasonable probability the defendant would have insisted on going to trial. | Martinez: §1016.5 entitles defendant time to negotiate; rejecting to seek a different plea counts as prejudice. | Held: A defendant may show prejudice by proving he would have rejected the existing plea to obtain or attempt to negotiate a different plea that avoided immigration consequences; going to trial is not the only relevant alternative. |
| May the trial court consider likelihood of better trial outcome when assessing credibility? | State: court should consider probable trial outcome (and rely on it to deny relief). | Martinez: outcome probability is a factor for credibility but not dispositive. | Held: Probable trial outcome is a relevant credibility factor but cannot substitute for the required inquiry into what the defendant would have done. |
| Was Martinez entitled to relief on the record? | State: trial court correctly denied relief because a more favorable outcome was unlikely. | Martinez: the trial court never assessed whether he would have rejected the plea to seek another bargain; remand needed. | Held: Trial court applied wrong test; remand for further proceedings to allow Martinez to present evidence on whether he would have rejected the plea if properly advised. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Superior Court (Zamudio), 23 Cal.4th 183 (established §1016.5 prejudice test: reasonable probability defendant would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (failure to advise about deportation can be constitutionally ineffective assistance; deportation is integral to sentencing for noncitizens)
- In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230 (2001) (immigration consequences are material to plea decisions; courts may relieve pleas entered without such knowledge)
- People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956) (reasonable-probability prejudice standard applied in plea-advice contexts)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (Strickland prejudice in plea context requires reasonable probability the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (counsel’s failure that causes forfeiture of a proceeding requires a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the loss of that proceeding)
- People v. McClellan, 6 Cal.4th 367 (1993) (defendant must present evidence supporting claim of prejudice from failure to advise)
- People v. Walker, 54 Cal.3d 1013 (1991) (defendant might decline a plea because of substantial restitution fines)
- In re Moser, 6 Cal.4th 342 (1993) (prejudice may be shown by demonstrating reliance on plea-related sentencing/parole information)
