People v. Marshall
242 Ill. 2d 285
| Ill. | 2011Background
- Marshall had prior felony convictions that required DNA submission and a $200 analysis fee; his DNA was already registered in CODIS before the present sentencing.
- At sentencing for first degree murder, the court imposed 33 years and a mandatory DNA testing assessment of $200.
- Marshall challenged the trial court’s authority to order another DNA sample and another $200 fee, asserting his DNA was already on file.
- The appellate court held the issue forfeited but affirmed the trial court’s order under section 5-4-3; this Court granted leave to appeal.
- The majority holds that section 5-4-3 authorizes DNA submission and the $200 fee only when the defendant is not already registered, preventing duplicative sampling and fees.
- The judgment is reversed in part: the appellate court’s ruling is reversed, and the trial court’s order to require an additional DNA sample and fee is vacated; conviction affirmed in all other respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 5-4-3 require a new DNA sample and fee if already on file? | Marshall argues the statute bars duplicative sampling and fees for previously registered DNA. | People maintain the statute authorizes additional sampling and fees as needed. | No; only one sample/fee is required if already registered. |
| Is section 5-4-3 ambiguous and subject to extrinsic aids? (statutory interpretation) | Marshall relies on silence in the statute to argue against duplicative sampling. | People rely on ambiguity and agency interpretation to permit multiple samples/fees. | The statute is ambiguous; extrinsic aids, including agency interpretation, may be considered. |
| May a court order additional DNA submission and fee for a defendant previously registered when not otherwise covered? | Marshall contends there is no statutory authorization for multiple samples/fees. | People argue a court has discretion under 5-4-3(a-5) to order sampling in other circumstances. | Court authority is limited to cases where the defendant is not yet registered. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104 (2006) (DNA database purpose and population scope)
- People v. Rigsby, 405 Ill. App. 3d 916 (2010) (ambiguous statute permits extrinsic aids; supports single-sample interpretation)
- People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d 395 (2009) (one DNA sample suffices; fee should be vacated when sampling is duplicative)
- People v. Willis, 402 Ill. App. 3d 47 (2010) (repeated DNA analysis fee discussed in light of Evangelista)
- People v. Grayer, 403 Ill. App. 3d 797 (2010) (statutory silence on duplicative sampling analyzed; endorses broader interpretation)
- Bomar, 405 Ill. App. 3d 139 (2010) (extrinsic aids may be used where statute is silent)
- Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237 (2008) (principles of statutory interpretation and avoidance of meaningless provisions)
- Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 503 (2011) (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
