People v. Marsh
20 Cal. App. 5th 694
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Defendant Daniel William Marsh, born May 1997, was tried and in Sept. 2014 convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder (with personal use of a deadly weapon) for killings committed in April 2013; three special-circumstance allegations were found true.
- The jury found Marsh sane at the time of the offenses; the trial court imposed an indeterminate life term with a 52-year minimum after an individualized sentencing assessment.
- Marsh was one month shy of his 16th birthday at the time of the killings; the opinion summarizes he stalked a neighborhood, selected the victims’ home, killed and mutilated the victims.
- On appeal Marsh argued that Miller v. Alabama and Roper v. Simmons —which rely on adolescent brain-development research to limit juvenile punishment—also require that the insanity/ sanity determination for juveniles use an “irresistible impulse” test (rather than California’s statutory right-wrong test).
- The People conceded that a 2016 initiative limiting direct filing by prosecutors in juvenile court (i.e., requiring judicial transfer hearings) applies retroactively, so the Court conditionally reversed for a juvenile transfer hearing.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Marsh’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether due process or Eighth Amendment principles require use of an “irresistible impulse” test for juvenile sanity determinations | Existing California statutory/right–wrong test is constitutionally permissible; no federal rule mandating a single insanity formulation | Miller/Roper’s adolescent-development findings require use of irresistible-impulse as the sanity standard for juveniles | Rejected — no constitutional mandate to adopt irresistible-impulse; trial court instructions were proper |
| Whether Miller/Roper’s reasoning about reduced juvenile culpability extends to insanity defense | Miller/Roper address sentencing, not the definition of criminal responsibility or insanity | The science underlying Miller/Roper (adolescent inability to control behavior) compels redefinition of sanity for juveniles | Rejected — Miller’s sentencing rationale does not translate into a required insanity test; different constitutional concerns and functions |
| Whether the Eighth Amendment/disproportionate punishment doctrine forces substantive changes in insanity law for juveniles | Disproportionality doctrine governs punishment severity and does not require redefining criminal responsibility elements | Juveniles’ lesser culpability means they should be insulated from culpability-based sanity rules that ignore developmental control deficits | Rejected — allowing such a rule would transform federal courts into national arbiters of criminal responsibility and undermine state prerogatives; Powell and related precedent foreclose this approach |
| Whether the 2016 initiative (limiting prosecutors’ direct filing of juveniles) applies retroactively to Marsh | Initiative applies retroactively to appeals not final; People concede applicability | Marsh sought application of the initiative to his pending appeal | Granted as to procedure — judgment conditionally reversed and remanded for a juvenile transfer hearing; if transfer to criminal court would not have occurred, convictions treated as juvenile adjudications |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juvenile life-without-parole sentences for homicide are subject to Eighth Amendment limits because children are constitutionally different for sentencing)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed as juveniles)
- Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (no single constitutional formulation of insanity is required; states have latitude)
- Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (court declines to formulate a constitutional rule defining insanity or involuntariness; criminal-responsibility formulations belong to states)
- Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (due process does not compel adoption of irresistible-impulse test)
- People v. Hajek and Vo, 58 Cal.4th 1144 (2014) (refuses to analogize mental illness exclusions from death penalty to broader categorical exemptions; leaves determinations to legislature)
- People v. Drew, 22 Cal.3d 333 (1978) (previous California adoption of an expanded insanity standard later abrogated by the electorate and statutory reform)