People v. Marroquin
JAD17-13
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 25, 2017Background
- Defendant Jacob Marroquin was charged with misdemeanor possession of a nanchaku and possession of drug paraphernalia; he pleaded guilty at the trial court hearing.
- The trial court told defendant it would defer judgment and dismiss the case if he remained a "good citizen" and did not reoffend for one year.
- The prosecutor objected, citing the county pilot deferral program (Pen. Code §§1001.94–1001.99) which bars deferral when a charge involves a dangerous weapon; the court nonetheless proceeded.
- The People filed writ petitions and this court issued Palma notices indicating the trial court lacked authority to grant nonstatutory diversion over the prosecutor’s objection; the trial court vacated its statutory diversion basis and asserted inherent judicial authority to defer sentencing.
- After the deferral period, the trial court set aside the plea and dismissed the complaint under Penal Code §1385. The People appealed; the appellate division reversed the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may create a nonstatutory deferral/diversion (defer judgment and dismiss later) over prosecutor objection | Trial court acted without statutory authority; such ad hoc diversion conflicts with Legislature’s scheme and is an abuse of discretion | Trial court has inherent authority to defer sentencing, accept pleas with conditions, and later dismiss (citing Legislative Counsel opinion) | Court held trial courts lack authority to implement nonstatutory deferral over prosecutor objection; dismissal reversed |
| Whether the statutory pilot program’s weapon prohibition (Pen. Code §1001.98(h)(2)) can be avoided by judicially-created deferral | People: Legislature limited deferral for weapon cases; court cannot sidestep statutory restrictions | Defendant: Court can exercise sentencing discretion or use inherent authority to achieve same result | Court held the Legislature’s limitations govern; judicially-created deferral cannot be used to evade statutory bar |
| Whether dismissal under §1385 was permissible after plea and without sentencing (i.e., as part of sentencing discretion or an indicated sentence) | People: §1385 dismissal here exceeded court’s sentencing authority because no sentence was imposed and statutory alternatives exist | Defendant: Action was within sentencing discretion or an indicated sentence allowing dismissal without prosecutor consent | Court held §1385 dismissal was improper in this posture; court had no authority to set aside plea and dismiss absent statutory authorization or proper sentencing/probation procedure |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Gelardi, 84 Cal.App.3d 692 (trial court cannot create ad hoc diversion/dismissal program over prosecution; such acts are unauthorized)
- People v. Clancey, 56 Cal.4th 562 (trial court has broad sentencing discretion within legislative limits)
- People v. Tapia, 129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 (legislative diversion scheme does not grant general authority for courts to create nonstatutory diversion over prosecutor objection)
- People v. Allan, 49 Cal.App.4th 1507 (standards for dismissal in furtherance of justice under §1385)
- People v. Zeigler, 211 Cal.App.4th 638 (opinions must be read in light of facts presented)
- People v. Superior Court (Kasperack), 202 Cal.App.2d 850 (limits on court action after guilty plea: sentence, probation, or withhold judgment and probation)
- People v. Superior Court (Montano), 26 Cal.App.3d 668 (dismissal affects public interest; §1385 discretion is not absolute)