People v. Marquez
F070609
| Cal. Ct. App. | May 16, 2017Background
- In 2009, Victor Marquez (then 17) stabbed Maria Juarez 19 times during an attempted robbery; DNA and his confession tied him to the killing. He was charged and tried in adult court and convicted of first-degree murder with a robbery special circumstance.
- Original trial court sentenced Marquez to life without parole (LWOP); on appeal this court remanded for resentencing after Miller v. Alabama required individualized consideration of juvenile characteristics.
- At resentencing, the court reviewed extensive mental-health records (experts conflicted over psychosis, malingering, and borderline intellectual functioning), juvenile adjudications (including a serious sex offense), dysfunctional and abusive childhood, and post-conviction jail incidents indicating continued violence.
- Marquez submitted at resentencing and told the court he would not present further evidence and sought to accept the sentence; the court nevertheless considered Miller factors and reimposed LWOP.
- Marquez appealed, arguing (1) misapplication of Miller/Gutierrez factors and Eighth Amendment violation, and (2) that Proposition 57’s juvenile transfer rules are retroactive and thus require a juvenile-court fitness hearing for his direct-filed adult prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Marquez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court properly applied Miller/Gutierrez at resentencing | Court complied with Miller/Gutierrez; weighed youth factors and mitigating evidence and permissibly found irreparable corruption | Court failed to give proper weight to juvenile immaturity, mental-health evidence, and prior appellate guidance; LWOP violates Eighth Amendment | Affirmed: trial court properly considered Miller factors and did not violate Eighth Amendment |
| Whether Marquez forfeited appellate review by submitting at sentencing / waiving appeal | Forfeiture does not bar review here because appellate remand defined the scope of proceedings; court reviews application of Miller as matter of law and for substantial-evidence support of factual findings | Marquez argued he waived rights by submitting; he contends this should preclude reconsideration | Court reviewed on the merits (no forfeiture of appellate review of remand-directed tasks), but Marquez is estopped from adding new factual evidence not presented at resentencing |
| Whether Proposition 57’s transfer/fitness hearing provisions apply retroactively | Proposition 57 is procedural, not a reduction of punishment; Penal Code §3 presumes prospective application absent express retroactivity | Proposition 57 lessens punishment and creates an affirmative defense to direct filing; Estrada requires retroactivity where penalties are mitigated | Retroactivity denied: Proposition 57 is procedural and prospective (Plaintiff prevailing); Estrada rule inapplicable |
| Whether federal due process / Sixth Amendment required a fitness hearing or procedural protections for direct filing | Manduley controls: prosecutorial discretion to direct-file is an executive function and does not trigger Kent-type juvenile transfer protections | Marquez argues Kent and due process require a hearing because juvenile status implicates liberty interests | Denied: Manduley remains binding; no Kent-type entitlement where prosecutor directly files in adult court |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; courts must consider ‘‘distinctive attributes of youth’’)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (juveniles cannot receive LWOP for nonhomicide offenses; juveniles have diminished culpability)
- People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Cal. 2014) (trial court must consider Miller factors when sentencing juvenile murderers; no presumption for LWOP)
- Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 (Cal. 2002) (prosecutorial direct-filing discretion is executive function and Kent procedural protections do not apply to prosecutor’s charging decision)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Cal. 1965) (statutory mitigation of punishment generally presumed retroactive to nonfinal judgments)
- People v. Brown, 54 Cal.4th 314 (Cal. 2012) (clarifies limits of Estrada; prospective operation is default for procedural changes unless legislative intent indicates otherwise)
- Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (U.S. 1966) (juvenile transfer proceedings require certain procedural protections when statute vests judicial waiver authority)