People v. Margerum, 2018 COA 52

Defendant Lance Margerum was tried for multiple offenses after two women (E.S. and T.M.) reported sexual and physical assaults in a friend’s apartment; the jury convicted on unlawful sexual contact (as to E.S.), third-degree assault and menacing with a deadly weapon (as to T.M.).
E.S. had a prior misdemeanor forgery conviction and was serving a one-year probation in a different county at the time of trial; defense sought to impeach her with that probationary status and the underlying misconduct.
The trial court allowed impeachment with respect to the underlying forgery facts but excluded questioning about E.S.’s probationary status.
Defendant argued on appeal that exclusion of cross-examination about probation violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights (Davis v. Alaska line of authority).
Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of evidence for felony menacing, arguing the same single act that supported the assault conviction could not also support menacing.
The court of appeals affirmed: (1) probationary status alone, absent facts linking it to motive/bias, does not compel cross-examination; (2) a single physical act may support both assault and menacing if the defendant’s conduct shows intent to place the victim in fear.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether exclusion of impeachment cross‑examination about a witness’s probation violated Confrontation Clause	E.S. had probation but no link to the prosecution; trial court properly limited impeachment	Probationary status itself shows motive/bias and Davis requires opportunity to probe that status	Probation status alone is not automatically admissible; defendant must show a logical factual connection between probation and motive to testify; exclusion was not error
Whether there was sufficient evidence for felony menacing where the same physical act also supported assault	The strangling placed victim in fear and supported menacing; single act can support multiple offenses	A victim must be put in fear before injury and menacing cannot rest on the same single act as assault	Menacing can be supported by the same act that causes injury if defendant’s conduct shows intent practically certain to cause fear; evidence was sufficient

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (probation status may be probative of bias where facts show a direct connection to motive to testify)
Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008) (test requires case‑specific showing that witness’s testimony might be influenced by expectation of leniency)
People v. Jones, 971 P.2d 243 (Colo. App. 1998) (upholding exclusion of probationary status where no evidence probation was jeopardized)
Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (probationary status not automatically admissible; must show logical connection to motive)
Melanson, 937 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1996) (probation in another jurisdiction may be irrelevant to bias at a Colorado trial)
People v. Truesdale, 804 P.2d 287 (Colo. App. 1990) (menacing is not a lesser‑included offense of assault; convictions can stand separately)
People v. James, 497 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1972) (a single transaction may violate multiple statutes)