109 A.D.3d 937
N.Y. App. Div.2013Background
- Defendant convicted by jury of burglary in the second degree (seven counts) and criminal possession of stolen property, with sentence imposed.
- Police investigated Brooklyn burglaries in Dec. 2007 and enlisted the defendant’s parole officer to visit the defendant’s apartment.
- Parole officer and law enforcement entered the defendant’s residence; detective observed a ring resembling a stolen item; Miranda warnings were given and a search allegedly yielded stolen property.
- Defendant was taken to the station, where he admitted to 9 of 12 burglaries.
- Supreme Court suppressed the entry as non-parole-related and found issues with consent and plain view; on appeal, the court reversed and suppressed the physical evidence and statements, ordering a new trial.
- Court did not reach whether the sentence was excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the apartment entry lawful under the Fourth Amendment? | People contend parole duties justified entry. | Definition of entry improper; no parole-related objective. | Entry unlawful; suppression warranted. |
| Was the defendant's consent to search voluntary? | Consent was freely given under parole supervision. | Consent was not freely voluntary; tainted by authority. | Consent not voluntary; suppression required. |
| Can the seizure be upheld under plain view or Fourth Amendment exceptions? | Plain view justified seizure once entry lawful. | Plain view thereof; evidence admissible. | Plain view cannot save seizure; suppression required. |
| Is the appellate review barred from considering the diminished privacy claim for parolees? | Issue should be reviewed on the merits. | Courts barred from addressing due to prior ruling. | Jurisdictional bar applies; issue not reached. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122 (N.Y. 1976) (consent to search must be voluntary and free from coercion)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (voluntariness of consent depends on free will, not official authority)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (U.S. 1968) (can’t rely on coercive authority for voluntary consent)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1963) (fruit of illegal seizure suppressed)
- People v. Johnson, 63 N.Y.2d 888 (N.Y. 1984) (parole searches require proper justification)
- People v. Matta, 76 A.D.2d 844 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (limits on implied consent under parole conditions)
- People v. Brown, 96 N.Y.2d 80 (N.Y. 2001) (plain view doctrine and lawful entry)