People v. Maggio
2017 IL App (4th) 150287
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On July 21, 2010, Brian D. Maggio shot and killed his brother Mark in a grocery store after an altercation; Maggio claimed he acted in self-defense, saying he saw a flash and believed Mark was armed.
- Maggio gave a post-Miranda statement to police that omitted some details later asserted at trial (notably that he believed Mark was actually armed).
- At a January 2015 jury trial Maggio was convicted of first-degree murder; the jury received first- and second-degree murder and self-defense instructions but the court denied an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
- At sentencing in March 2015 the court imposed a 65-year prison term and remarked that Maggio refused to cooperate with the presentence investigation (PSI); the court considered that refusal in aggravation.
- Maggio appealed, raising claims of ineffective assistance (failure to object to use of his post-Miranda statement and failure to request alternative self-defense language), error in refusing an involuntary manslaughter instruction, improper consideration of PSI refusal at sentencing, and that certain fines were not offset by his per diem credit.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Maggio’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Use of post-Miranda statements for impeachment (Doyle claim) | The statements were admissible because Maggio waived Miranda and voluntarily spoke; omissions create prior-inconsistent statements usable to impeach. | Use of omissions after Miranda to impeach violated Doyle and counsel was ineffective for not objecting. | No Doyle violation; defendant spoke after Miranda and did not invoke silence. Counsel not ineffective on this ground. |
| 2. Failure to request forcible-felony language in self-defense instruction | The standard self-defense instruction already required the jury to consider whether force was necessary to prevent death/great bodily harm; forcible-felony language was unnecessary. | Counsel ineffective for not requesting added proviso that deadly force can be used to prevent a forcible felony (e.g., aggravated battery or discharge). | No prejudice; omission harmless. Counsel not ineffective. |
| 3. Denial of involuntary manslaughter instruction | The evidence (intentional aim and discharge at ~4–5 feet) supported only intentional/knowing killing, not recklessness. | Evidence (no glasses, inaccurate gun, prior physical altercation) supported a reckless theory so a manslaughter instruction was warranted. | No abuse of discretion; no sufficient evidence of recklessness—instruction properly denied. |
| 4. Consideration of Maggio’s refusal to cooperate with PSI at sentencing | Forfeiture argued but, on merits, court says refusal reflected attitude/rehabilitative potential. | Refusal was an invocation of the Fifth Amendment and cannot be used in aggravation; sentencing error requires resentencing. | Court improperly relied on refusal (violated Fifth Amendment protections); sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing. |
| 5. Application of per diem credit to fines / classification of assessments | State conceded several assessments are fines and should be offset by per diem; some assessments (automation) treated as fees. | Argued multiple assessments are fines and must be offset. | Court accepted State’s concessions, classified several assessments as fines ($50 court finance fee; $10 arrestee medical; $10 state police operations; $10 traffic/criminal surcharge; $30 juvenile expungement; $5 drug court) and remanded to apply per diem credit. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prohibits impeachment by post-arrest silence after Miranda warnings)
- Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (a defendant who speaks after Miranda has not remained silent)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Frieberg v. People, 147 Ill. 2d 326 (1992) (post-Miranda statements that give a version later inconsistent with trial testimony may be used to impeach)
- Campbell v. People, 332 Ill. App. 3d 721 (2002) (Doyle inapplicable where defendant waived Miranda and gave a substantive version that later proved inconsistent)
- People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882 (2016) (denial of involuntary manslaughter instruction reviewed; insufficient evidence of recklessness where defendant intentionally stabbed/shot)
- Whiters v. People, 146 Ill. 2d 437 (1992) (involuntary manslaughter instruction required where conduct could be viewed as reckless)
- Ashford v. State, 121 Ill. 2d 55 (1988) (Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies at sentencing; defendant may refuse PSI cooperation)
- Chamness v. People, 129 Ill. App. 3d 871 (1985) (evidence of threat of great bodily harm considered by jury when assessing self-defense; forcible-felony language unnecessary)
- Hanson v. People, 138 Ill. App. 3d 530 (1985) (adopts Chamness reasoning on self-defense/forcible-felony issue)