People v. Macauley CA2/7
B264034
| Cal. Ct. App. | Oct 3, 2016Background
- Defendant Mohamed Macauley was convicted by a jury of two counts of pimping and two counts of pandering a minor; one pimping conviction was reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence and the matter was remanded for resentencing.
- Victims were two 13‑year‑old girls found after running away; Macauley transported them, put them to work as prostitutes, used another prostitute as lookout, bought clothing/heels, and photographed one victim to sell photos.
- At resentencing the court imposed an upper term (8 years) on the pimping count pertaining to A.H. and consecutive two‑year terms on two pandering counts, for a total of 12 years.
- The court explained the sentence by citing victim vulnerability, sophistication/ planning, leadership role, and escalating criminal history; defense requested lower/mid term and concurrent sentences based on mitigating factors (first time in state prison, good institutional conduct).
- On appeal Macauley challenged: (1) Sixth Amendment/Jury‑trial violations under Apprendi/Cunningham, (2) use of aggravating factors that are inherent in the offenses, and (3) reliance on the same factors to justify both the upper term and a consecutive sentence.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence, remanded for recalculation of presentence custody credits and correction of the abstract of judgment (to remove the reversed conviction and reflect accurate sentencing).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Macauley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Did imposing the upper term based on judge‑stated aggravating factors violate the Sixth Amendment? | The current §1170(b) allows judge discretion to select term without additional fact‑finding, so no violation. | Court relied on facts not found by jury to impose upper term, violating Apprendi/Cunningham. | Rejected. Amended §1170(b) permits judicial discretion to choose upper term without jury findings; Cunningham defect cured. |
| 2. Did the court improperly rely on factors intrinsic to the offenses (elements) as aggravation? | Court may consider victim vulnerability and sophistication where they go beyond offense elements. | Some cited factors (e.g., vulnerability, sophistication) are inherent in pimping/pandering and thus improper. | Rejected. Victim’s extreme vulnerability (13, isolated, taken away from home) and defendant’s sophistication (use of lookout, shopping/clothing, photos, instruction) were distinct and permissible aggravators. |
| 3. Did the court improperly use the same facts to justify both upper term and consecutive sentence? | Even if overlap appears, only one valid aggravating factor needed for each; presumption court relied on different factors; any error harmless. | The same reasons were used twice, violating rule against dual use. | Rejected. Presumed court relied on victim vulnerability for upper term and sophistication for consecutive; any dual‑use error would be harmless. |
| 4. Procedural/clerical: Must custody credits and abstract of judgment be corrected on remand? | Court must recalculate credits to include custody up to resentencing and correct abstract to reflect vacated conviction and proper sentence on count 2. | Agreed defendant entitled to correct credits and abstract. | Granted. Case remanded to recalc presentence credits and issue corrected abstract of judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (rule on jury finding for facts increasing penalty)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (definition of "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes)
- Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (invalidated prior California sentencing procedure requiring judge‑found facts to impose upper term)
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (Apprendi line does not extend to judicial decision to impose consecutive sentences)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825 (California Supreme Court: amended §1170(b) cures Cunningham defect)
- People v. DeHoyos, 57 Cal.4th 79 (victim "particular vulnerability" doctrine)
- People v. Osband, 13 Cal.4th 622 (one aggravating factor suffices for upper term and consecutive sentence)
- People v. Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th 20 (recalculation of credits on resentencing remand)
- People v. Lincoln, 157 Cal.App.4th 196 (distinguishing improper use of "inherent high risk" as aggravation)
- People v. Charron, 193 Cal.App.3d 981 (sophistication/ planning can make crime distinctively worse)