People v. M.L.
370 P.3d 1151
| Colo. | 2016Background
- Mother (M.L.) appealed jury adjudications that four of her five children were "dependent or neglected" under § 19-3-102(1)(c) (injurious environment) after allegations of sexual touching by one child led to DHS involvement and placement of the offender child in foster care.
- The State's petition alleged multiple statutory bases; at trial the jury found "no" on parental-fault-based theories but "yes" that the children’s environment was injurious, leading to adjudication and a dispositional plan.
- M.L. objected to Jury Instruction 17 because it tracked the statutory language and did not require the jury to find parental acts/omissions (fault) as the cause of the injurious environment; she proffered the pattern instruction that added parental-act language.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Troxel v. Granville to require findings about each parent’s availability, ability, and willingness to provide reasonable parental care before adjudication.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals, holding Troxel does not require proof that both parents lack ability/availability/willingness nor findings of parental fault under § 19-3-102(1)(c); the jury instruction that tracked the statute was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (M.L.) | Defendant's Argument (State/GAL) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether adjudication under the injurious-environment provision requires the factfinder to evaluate each parent’s acts/omissions or their availability/ability/willingness to provide reasonable care | Jury must be instructed to consider each parent; a child cannot be adjudicated if at least one parent is available, able, and willing to provide reasonable parental care | Troxel does not alter statutory adjudication standards; statute and procedures already protect parental rights; no need to require proof both parents lack care capacity | Rejected plaintiff: Troxel does not require proof that both parents lack availability/ability/willingness before adjudication under § 19-3-102(1)(c) |
| Whether the injurious-environment statute requires findings of parental fault (i.e., that the environment is injurious due to parents’ acts or failures to act) | Statute should be read to require the jury to tie injurious environment findings to parental acts/omissions (pattern instruction) | § 19-3-102(1)(c) focuses on the child’s environment and omits fault-language; parental fault is not required for adjudication and is relevant to treatment plans, not adjudication | Rejected plaintiff: § 19-3-102(1)(c) does not require proof of parental fault; the jury may find an injurious environment without specific parental-fault findings |
| Whether Jury Instruction 17 (tracking statutory language) was erroneous compared to the pattern instruction adding parental-fault phrasing | Instruction 17 misstated law by omitting requirement to find parental fault and misled jurors | Instruction 17 accurately tracked the statute and did not violate Troxel or due process | Held for defendant: Instruction 17 was proper and not reversible error |
| Whether Troxel compels adding elements to adjudication stage similar to termination standards (e.g., inability/unwillingness) | Troxel supports presumption in favor of fit parents, requiring findings about each parent before adjudication | Troxel’s due-process protections are satisfied by existing statutory procedures (notice, counsel, trial, preponderance standard); no judicially added elements needed | Held for defendant: Troxel does not require grafting termination-stage elements onto adjudication-stage statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (federal due-process protection of parental autonomy; courts must give special weight to fit parents’ determinations)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (state must provide fundamentally fair procedures before interfering with parental rights)
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognition of parental liberty interest)
- L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271 (Colo. 2000) (Colorado held preponderance standard in dependency/neglect adjudication satisfies due process distinct from termination)
- Baby A. v. People, 363 P.3d 193 (Colo. 2015) (discussing evidentiary standards and special factors in termination appeals)
- A.M.D. v. People, 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982) (dependency/neglect purpose is to assist parents and preserve family; limits on termination)
- K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695 (Colo. 2006) (adjudications concern child’s status; prior decisions recognizing procedural protections for parents)