People v. Lusby, 117 N.E.3d 527

In 1996, then-16-year-old Ashanti Lusby was convicted of murder, aggravated sexual assault, and home invasion; he received an aggregate 130-year sentence (de facto life).
At sentencing the court remarked on Lusby’s youth only generally, found no mitigation, and imposed 100 years for murder plus consecutive 30-year terms for two Class X offenses.
Lusby filed a direct appeal and an initial postconviction petition; both were denied. In 2014 he sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition invoking Miller v. Alabama (issued after his earlier filings).
The State was permitted to file and argue objections to Lusby’s successive-petition motion; Lusby and his counsel were absent when the State argued. The trial court denied leave without explicitly analyzing Miller factors.
The Third District reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding Miller applies to de facto/discretionary life terms and that Lusby satisfied the cause-and-prejudice standard; it also held the State should not have been allowed to object at the cause-and-prejudice stage.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lusby)	Held
Whether Miller applies to Lusby’s de facto life sentence	Miller addresses mandatory life only; Davis precludes expansion to discretionary/de facto life	Miller requires consideration of youth and attendant characteristics before any life/de facto life sentence	Miller applies to discretionary and de facto life sentences; it governs here
Whether Lusby established cause to file a successive postconviction petition	Lack of earlier precedent is not cause; Lusby previously raised age at motion to reconsider	Miller post-dates his initial petition, so Miller is an external factor constituting cause	Lusby met cause because Miller was decided after his initial petition
Whether Lusby established prejudice for successive-petition leave	Trial court considered age; record shows no need for resentencing	Trial court did not meaningfully consider Miller factors; failure infected sentencing	Prejudice established: sentencing did not reflect Miller’s required individualized consideration; remand for resentencing required
Whether State could file/argue objections at cause-and-prejudice stage	State argued it was permitted to object	Lusby argued State participation at that stage is improper under the Act	Under People v. Bailey the State erred in filing/arguing objections at the cause-and-prejudice stage

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juveniles must have age and attendant characteristics considered before life-without-parole)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment bars death penalty for juveniles)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars juvenile life-without-parole for nonhomicide offenses)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (rules not always retroactive on collateral review; standards for retroactivity)
People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 (Ill.) (Miller constitutes cause for successive postconviction petitions and is substantive for retroactivity)
People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Ill.) (Miller applies to discretionary life sentences; trial courts must consider specified youth-related factors)
People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450 (Ill.) (State may not participate at the cause-and-prejudice stage of successive postconviction review)