People v. Lujano, 15 Cal. App. 5th 187

Background

Defendant Andres Lujano was tried for sodomy of an unconscious person (§ 286(f)) and sodomy of an intoxicated person (§ 286(i)); jury convicted on the intoxication count and acquitted on the unconscious count; sentence six years.
Victim Marco testified he drank heavily (20+ beers), used methamphetamine and marijuana, fell asleep on defendant's couch, and awoke to Lujano penetrating him; medical exam showed an actively bleeding anal laceration; sperm matched Lujano's DNA; 911 call and officers corroborated intoxication and victim's report.
Trial court instructed with CALCRIM No. 1032 defining: (1) act of sodomy, (2) victim prevented from resisting by intoxication, and (3) defendant knew or reasonably should have known of that condition; "prevented from resisting" explained as inability to give legal consent.
Lujano requested optional CALCRIM language stating an actual and reasonable belief that the victim was capable of consenting is a defense; trial court denied the request as duplicative/unsupported.
On appeal, Lujano argued the court erred in refusing the optional instruction; the court of appeal affirmed, holding no error and that any error would be harmless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred by refusing to give optional CALCRIM language that an actual and reasonable belief in victim's capacity to consent is a defense	The People: no separate instruction required because elements as given already cover the issue	Lujano: requested optional language as a defense (Mayberry-style) and argued the court should instruct the jury on it	No error — optional language was a pinpoint instruction duplicative of elements and definition already given; court properly declined
Whether "prevented from resisting" was correctly defined by CALCRIM No. 1032 as inability to give legal consent due to intoxication	The People: CALCRIM correctly mirrors statutory language and case law	Lujano: challenged need for optional language; did not dispute definition	Held correct — follows People v. Giardino and applies to §286(i) (victim not capable of giving legal consent)
Whether the omission (if erroneous) was prejudicial	The People: omission harmless because jury necessarily resolved factual question against defendant under other instructions	Lujano: omission deprived jury of defense framing and could be prejudicial	Harmless — omission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because jury found defendant knew or should have known victim lacked capacity, necessarily negating any reasonable belief to the contrary
Whether the optional language constitutes a Mayberry (reasonable mistake-of-fact) defense triggering sua sponte instruction duty	The People: Mayberry applies to forcible rape (actual consent); intoxication offense differs because lack of capacity, not lack of actual consent, is the element	Lujano: relied on Mayberry rationale to support instruction	Court: Mayberry defense is distinct and affirmative for forcible rape; for intoxication offenses the requested language merely negates an element and is not a separate sua sponte instruction duty

Key Cases Cited

People v. Giardino, 82 Cal.App.4th 454 (analysis that "prevented from resisting" means not capable of giving legal consent due to intoxication)
People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal.3d 143 (recognizes reasonable mistake-of-fact defense to rape based on belief in consent)
People v. Williams, 4 Cal.4th 354 (explains burden and operation of reasonable-good-faith mistake-of-fact defense)
People v. Hartsch, 49 Cal.4th 472 (instructional law: pinpoint instructions not required if duplicative)
People v. Braslaw, 233 Cal.App.4th 1239 (applies harmlessness analysis where belief in victim's capacity was necessarily resolved against defendant)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (standard for harmless federal constitutional error)
People v. Wright, 40 Cal.4th 81 (omitted-instruction harmlessness when factual question was necessarily resolved against defendant)