People v. Lujano
B269153
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 11, 2017Background
- Defendant Andres Lujano was tried for two counts: sodomy of an unconscious person (§ 286(f)) and sodomy of an intoxicated person (§ 286(i)); jury acquitted on the unconscious-count and convicted on the intoxication-count.
- Victim Marco testified he drank heavily, used methamphetamine, fell asleep on Lujano’s couch, awoke to anal pain with Lujano on top of him, and called 911; medical exam showed an actively bleeding anal laceration and sperm matching Lujano.
- Officers observed signs of intoxication; toxicology reports for both men were admitted by stipulation; Lujano did not testify or present witnesses.
- Trial court instructed under CALCRIM No. 1032 defining (1) the act, (2) that intoxication prevented resisting (i.e., inability to give legal consent), and (3) that defendant knew or reasonably should have known of that condition.
- Lujano requested optional CALCRIM language that an actual and reasonable belief in the victim’s capacity to consent is a defense; the court denied the request as duplicative/unsupported.
- Lujano was sentenced to six years; he appealed claiming prejudicial error in refusing the optional instruction on reasonable belief of capacity to consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by refusing optional CALCRIM language that an actual and reasonable belief the victim could consent is a defense | People: No error; the given CALCRIM instruction correctly stated the elements and definition of "prevented from resisting." | Lujano: Requested optional language was required/requested and would instruct jury that a reasonable belief in victim’s capacity is a defense. | No reversible error: the optional language was a pinpoint instruction that duplicated the elements and definition given, so no sua sponte duty to give it; refusal not prejudicial. |
| Proper meaning of "prevented from resisting" under § 286(i) | People: CALCRIM’s definition is correct: prevented from resisting means not capable of giving legal consent because of intoxication. | Lujano: (implicitly) contested scope/implication of optional language. | Court adopts Giardino analysis: "prevented from resisting" = lack of legal capacity to consent; CALCRIM No. 1032 correctly explains it. |
| Whether the optional language constitutes a Mayberry-type defense requiring sua sponte instruction | People: The Mayberry/ mistake-of-fact consent defense is different; here the defendant’s belief in capacity is element-negating, not an independent affirmative defense requiring sua sponte instruction. | Lujano: Characterized requested language as necessary equivalent to Mayberry defense instruction. | Held: Different crimes and elements—belief as to capacity here negates element (knowledge/reasonable should have known) and thus is duplicative; no sua sponte duty. |
| Whether omission of the optional language was harmless | People: Any error harmless because jury necessarily found defendant knew or reasonably should have known victim lacked capacity, resolving belief issue adversely to defendant. | Lujano: Omission was prejudicial and undermined his defense. | Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: omission did not affect verdict because properly given instructions resolved the factual question against Lujano. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Giardino, 82 Cal.App.4th 454 (analysis that "prevented from resisting" means not capable of giving legal consent due to intoxication)
- People v. Hartsch, 49 Cal.4th 472 (instructional rules: duplication and pinpoint instruction doctrine)
- People v. Williams, 4 Cal.4th 354 (Mayberry mistake-of-fact/consent defense and burden issues)
- People v. Braslaw, 233 Cal.App.4th 1239 (harmlessness: reasonable-belief-of-capacity question necessarily resolved by guilty verdict on intoxication offense)
- People v. Bolden, 29 Cal.4th 515 (court need not give duplicative or argumentative instructions)
- People v. Wright, 40 Cal.4th 81 (omitted-instruction harmlessness standard where factual question was necessarily resolved against defendant)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for federal constitutional error)