People v. Lowder, 2023 IL App (4th) 220315-U

In 2007 Bryce K. Lowder (age 18 at the time) shot into a car, killing one victim and injuring another; he pleaded guilty to first‑degree murder and aggravated battery and received concurrent sentences of 40 and 5 years.
Lowder filed initial postconviction petitions (2008, supplemented 2015); those petitions were denied and earlier appeals affirmed.
In June 2019 and again in December 2021 Lowder sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing his 40‑year sentence was unconstitutional as applied under Illinois’ proportionate penalties clause because his youth (“emerging adult”) required Miller protections.
The circuit court denied leave to file the successive petition, concluding Miller did not apply to Lowder’s circumstances and he failed to show cause and prejudice; Lowder also asserted his plea was involuntary based on Rule 402 compliance.
Lowder additionally challenged the constitutionality (equal protection) of 730 ILCS 5/5‑4.5‑115, a statutory amendment effective June 1, 2019 that makes offenders under 21 eligible for parole only if sentenced on or after that effective date, arguing the prospective cutoff unjustifiably discriminates against him.
The appellate court affirmed: (1) denial of leave to file the successive petition and (2) rejection of Lowder’s facial equal protection challenge to the statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Lowder)	Held
Whether Lowder satisfied the cause & prejudice standard to file a successive postconviction petition based on Miller/proportionate‑penalties clause	Miller-based developments do not supply cause for a successive proportionate‑penalties claim; Lowder’s negotiated plea waived nonjurisdictional claims; his 40‑year term is not a de facto life sentence	Miller and its progeny require consideration of youth; as an emerging adult (age 18) Lowder’s sentence is disproportionate and Miller supports relief	Denied. Court held Lowder failed to show cause and prejudice; Buffer/Dorsey/Jones/Clark preclude his successive Miller‑based challenge and his plea waived the claim
Whether 730 ILCS 5/5‑4.5‑115 (prospective parole eligibility cutoff of June 1, 2019) is facially invalid under equal protection	The prospective application is rationally related to legitimate objectives (complying with Miller, preserving finality, protecting victims’ expectations, preserving administrative/judicial resources); rational‑basis review applies	No rational basis for distinguishing similarly situated offenders based solely on sentencing date; the cutoff irrationally denies retroactive parole eligibility	Rejected. The statute is facially constitutional under rational‑basis review; prospective application is a reasonable legislative classification

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juveniles cannot be mandatorily sentenced to life without parole without individualized youth‑based consideration)
People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (2019) (Illinois: sentences over 40 years constitute de facto life sentences for Miller analysis)
People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 (2021) (Miller does not provide cause for successive proportionate‑penalties claims; 40‑year cutoff limits de facto life findings)
People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432 (2021) (a fully negotiated guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional constitutional challenges, including those premised on later changes in law)
People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273 (2023) (Miller‑based changes to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence do not supply cause for successive state proportionate‑penalties claims by young adults)
People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (2016) (Illinois expanded Miller protections to de facto life sentences)
People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255 (2015) (prospective application of statutory amendments can be rationally related to legislative objectives such as avoiding confusion and preserving resources)
Grant v. People, 71 Ill. 2d 551 (1978) (legislature may confer new sentencing benefits prospectively; distinguishing those already sentenced is a reasonable basis)