People v. Lopez
235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64
Cal.2018Background
- In 1999, 21-month-old Ashley D. was brought to the hospital unconscious with extensive bruising, severe genital trauma, and a fatal skull fracture; she died after being removed from life support. Defendant Michael Lopez and Sandra Harris had been caring for Ashley for several days prior to her death.
- A jury convicted Lopez of first degree murder (with a torture special circumstance), assault resulting in death of a child, and forcible lewd and lascivious conduct on a child; found a great-bodily-injury enhancement and five prior prison terms; returned a death verdict. Harris was convicted separately and is not a party to this appeal.
- Prosecution evidence included medical testimony describing hundreds of bruises, massive blunt-force genital trauma consistent with forced penetration, and a severe skull fracture; child witnesses S.B. and M.L. testified to witnessing Lopez abuse Ashley; forensic testing tied blood on Lopez’s clothing to Ashley.
- Defense theory: Lopez lacked intent due to methamphetamine intoxication; alternative perpetrators (Harris, Laurie, M.L., other children); challenged competency and reliability of child witnesses and some evidentiary rulings.
- Penalty-phase evidence included multiple prior violent incidents introduced by the prosecution and family/friends and neuropsychological mitigation evidence presented by the defense; the prosecutor rebutted with welfare-fraud evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility/competency of child-witness testimony (Evid. Code §§701/702; due process) | Children's testimony was competent, had personal knowledge, and was corroborated; cross-examination addressed inconsistencies. | Children lacked personal knowledge and were ‘‘brainwashed’’/coached; testimony unreliable, violating due process and Eighth Amendment standards in capital case. | Admission not an abuse of discretion; sufficient evidence of personal knowledge; reliability issues for jurors to weigh; no due-process violation. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for first-degree murder, torture special circumstance, sexual assault, and great-bodily-injury enhancement | Evidence (medical, eyewitness, pattern of escalating abuse, motive, concealment) supported premeditation/deliberation, torture intent, sexual assault, and GBI. | Evidence insufficient to prove Lopez was the perpetrator or had requisite intent; alternative perpetrators plausible. | Evidence adequate to support convictions, special circumstance, and enhancements. |
| Admission of testimony re: S.B.’s broken leg and fear (relevance/1101/352) | Evidence was probative to explain S.B.’s fear, credibility, and why she initially lied; limited and properly instructed. | Inflammatory, irrelevant propensity evidence prejudicial under §1101(b) and §352. | No abuse of discretion: probative for credibility; court limited scope and gave limiting instruction. |
| Jury unanimity and instruction issues (multiple theories of first-degree murder; penalty-phase guidance on aggravating acts) | Multiple-theory instructions proper; jury may convict under any valid theory; court correctly told jury aggravating factors were limited to five listed acts and could consider all trial evidence for penalty within that limit. | Failure to require jury unanimity on theory; instruction and prosecutor comments may have allowed consideration of inadmissible aggravating evidence. | Court followed controlling precedent rejecting unanimity requirement; response to jurors correctly stated law and did not permit impermissible consideration. |
| Coercion of jury / refusal to discharge stressed juror | Court’s questioning and refusal to excuse juror coerced verdict; juror with prepaid trip and juror expressing distress should have been excused. | Court properly exercised discretion, probative inquiry showed reasonable probability of reaching verdict; juror willing to continue; no coercion. | No coercion or abuse of discretion in refusing to discharge juror; handling of deadlock and juror stress was within court’s discretion. |
| Prosecutor comments and rebuttal evidence at penalty phase (Griffin; scope of rebuttal) | Prosecutor’s references to lack of remorse did not comment on defendant’s silence; welfare-fraud rebuttal was proper to counter character/mitigation evidence. | Comments amounted to Griffin error; welfare-fraud was out-of-scope, unfairly prejudicial. | No Griffin violation: prosecutor noted absence of evidence of remorse, not defendant’s silence on the stand; welfare-fraud admissible rebuttal to generalized character evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Anderson, 25 Cal.4th 543 (test for witness personal knowledge and admission standard)
- People v. Dennis, 17 Cal.4th 468 (child witness reliability and confrontation rights in capital cases)
- People v. Whisenhunt, 44 Cal.4th 174 (continuing/escalating abuse supports premeditation and torture findings)
- People v. Streeter, 54 Cal.4th 205 (elements and proof of torture-murder)
- People v. Steger, 16 Cal.3d 539 (contrast on torture intent vs. reactive discipline)
- People v. Geier, 41 Cal.4th 555 (no unanimity requirement as to theory of murder)
- People v. Loker, 44 Cal.4th 691 (scope of rebuttal character evidence at penalty phase)
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (prohibition on prosecutorial comment on defendant’s silence)