People v. Lockett CA2/8
B301103
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jul 23, 2021Background
- In 2012 Houston was shot and killed after an altercation involving defendants Henderson, Lockett, Sullivan, two known associates (one later identified as the shooter), and others; the shooter was not apprehended at trial.
- The defendants were tried jointly on murder; jury was instructed on first/second degree murder, aiding and abetting, and the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine (with assault/battery as target offenses).
- Jury acquitted on first-degree murder but convicted all three of second-degree murder; gang enhancement was found not true; Lockett and Henderson received long prison terms.
- Under SB 1437 (Pen. Code §1170.95) Lockett and Henderson petitioned for resentencing, arguing their convictions rested on theories now abrogated (felony murder / natural-and-probable-consequences).
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing relying on the record of conviction, found the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioners were principals who shared the killer’s intent, and denied relief.
- The appellate court reversed: it held the trial court’s finding that petitioners knew and shared the shooter’s intent (i.e., acted with malice) was not supported by substantial evidence and directed the trial court to grant resentencing under §1170.95.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court impermissibly re‑try guilt / violate collateral estoppel when resolving §1170.95? | People: court may independently review the record and decide ineligibility under §1170.95(d)(3). | Lockett/Henderson: trial court effectively re‑litigated guilt and ignored the jury’s verdict. | Not reached as a dispositive ruling — appellate court reversed on insufficiency of evidence. |
| Did the trial court apply the correct burden/standard in the §1170.95 proceeding? | People: prosecution bears BARD to prove ineligibility; court applied record review under that standard. | Defendants: court misapplied standards and improperly considered matters resolved at trial. | Not resolved as dispositive; appellate decision turned on insufficiency of evidence. |
| Was there sufficient evidence that petitioners knew and shared the shooter’s intent (malice) to sustain denial of §1170.95 relief? | People: circumstantial inferences (calls to "homies," knowledge of a gun in the car, coordinated return, gang motive) support finding they were principals who shared intent to kill. | Defendants: no direct evidence of knowledge or intent; inferences are speculative and jury rejected first‑degree theory. | Held: Insufficient evidence — inferences relied on by the trial court were speculative; reversal required and petitions must be granted. |
| Are petitioners eligible for relief under SB 1437 / §1170.95? | People: even after SB 1437, petitioners were ineligible because they were principals who acted with malice or were major participants with reckless indifference. | Defendants: convictions were premised on theories now limiting liability; they are eligible for resentencing. | Held: Petitioners are entitled to relief; appellate court reversed denial and remanded with directions to grant resentencing under §1170.95. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Perez, 35 Cal.4th 1219 (elements for direct aiding and abetting liability)
- People v. Lewis, 43 Cal. App. 5th 1128 (interpretation of SB 1437 / petition eligibility procedure)
- People v. Clements, 60 Cal. App. 5th 597 (standard of review for §1170.95 factual determinations)
- Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (conviction validity must be appraised on the case as tried)
- People v. Lindberg, 45 Cal.4th 1 (substantial evidence review principles)
- People v. Cravens, 53 Cal.4th 500 (definition of express and implied malice)
- People v. Bohana, 84 Cal. App. 4th 360 (limits on drawing speculative inferences from circumstantial evidence)