People v. Lilly
53 N.E.3d 1028
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- Gregory L. Lilly was arrested May 24, 2013, charged with burglary and retail theft, and remained in custody; the Speedy Trial Act 120‑day clock began May 25.
- Trial originally set for August 19, 2013; court and defense discussed a bond‑reduction hearing and rescheduling; a written order noted the matter was continued on "the Defendant"'s motion.
- Defense counsel changed (Mark Rose to Tom Sheets) on September 6; defendant repeatedly asserted he wished to "use [his] 120" and demanded trial within 120 days.
- Multiple pro se letters/motions by defendant (including motions to substitute judge) prompted transfers to the chief judge and reassignment, producing additional continuances.
- The trial court apportioned various periods of delay between State and defendant, concluding fewer than 120 days were attributable to the State; trial began December 3, 2013; defendant convicted and sentenced.
- Appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in attributing various delays to defendant and that the trial occurred within the statutory 120 days attributable to the State.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Lilly) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 28‑day period (Aug 20–Sept 16) is attributable to defendant | Defense counsel agreed to continue on defendant's motion (bond reduction), so delay is chargeable to defendant | Defendant says he objected and expressly demanded his 120 days; he did not agree to the continuance | Attributed to defendant: counsel agreed to continuance and defendant did not promptly repudiate it |
| Whether the 7‑day period (Sept 17–Sept 23) during resolution of pro se substitution letter is attributable to defendant | Pro se letter construed as motion to substitute judge halted trial; delay is defendant's | Defendant contends he had counsel and no right to file pro se motion; court should have asked counsel to adopt or strike it | Attributed to defendant: pro se filing prevented immediate trial regardless of counsel status |
| Whether the 3‑day gap after Sept 23 is attributable to defendant | Court treated some September days as defendant delay | Defendant objects: he was ready to proceed and objected to continuance | Not chargeable to defendant: court's unavailability (older case) caused delay; these days belong to State |
| Whether the remainder (including Oct 8–Dec 3) pushes trial beyond 120 days | State argues remaining days are largely defendant‑caused (additional motions to substitute judge, pro se filings) | Defendant argues cumulative delays should be charged to State and his 120 expired | Held: after reallocation the clock tolled at 101 days; remaining time attributable to defendant; trial within 120 days, conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305 (Illinois Supreme Court) (trial court's attribution of delay to defendant reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131 (Illinois Supreme Court) (continuance requested by defense counsel is attributable to defendant)
- People v. Mayo, 198 Ill. 2d 530 (Illinois Supreme Court) (speedy trial period tolling begins day after custody)
- People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380 (Illinois Supreme Court) (a "delay" is any action moving trial date outside 120‑day window; defendant must object to delay)
- People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (Illinois Supreme Court) (delay from judge unavailability not chargeable to defendant)
- People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420 (Illinois Supreme Court) (motions filed by defendant that prevent immediate trial toll the clock)
- People v. Shaw, 24 Ill. 2d 219 (Illinois Supreme Court) (method for computing speedy‑trial days)
- People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286 (Illinois Supreme Court) (agreed continuance generally attributable to defendant)
- People v. Ladd, 294 Ill. App. 3d 928 (Ill. App. Ct.) (filing a motion does not automatically toll speedy‑trial rights; court must consider whether motion caused delay)
- People v. Plair, 292 Ill. App. 3d 396 (Ill. App. Ct.) (crowded dockets ordinarily rest with State; mixed‑cause delays can be tolled by defendant acts)
- People v. Peco, 345 Ill. App. 3d 724 (Ill. App. Ct.) (affirmative record demand required to preserve speedy‑trial claim)
- People v. LaFaire, 374 Ill. App. 3d 461 (Ill. App. Ct.) (distinguished on facts involving section 103‑5(b))
- People v. Zeleny, 396 Ill. App. 3d 917 (Ill. App. Ct.) (distinguished; involved defendants on recognizance under section 103‑5(b))