People v. Leiva
56 Cal. 4th 498
| Cal. | 2013Background
- Leiva pled no contest to three counts of burglary of a vehicle and was placed on formal probation for three years, expiring April 11, 2003, but he was deported on release.
- On September 21, 2001, the trial court summarily revoked probation for failing to report, issuing a bench warrant; neither court nor probation officials knew he had been deported.
- November 10, 2008, after his arrest on the outstanding warrant, the court kept probation summarily revoked and scheduled a formal probation violation hearing for February 13, 2009; a supplemental report disclosed his deportation and February 2007 return to the U.S.
- At the February 13, 2009 hearing, the People conceded a willful violation could not be proven; the court found a violation in 2007 for failing to report, reinstated and extended probation to June 6, 2011, with conditions about reporting after reentry.
- Defendant was deported again in March 2009; in June 2009 a new hearing summarily revoked probation for failure to report; at a September 2009 hearing the court found a 2009 violation for illegal reentry and sentenced him to prison; defendant appealed challenging the authority to reinstate/extend probation after expiration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether tolling allows extension based on post-expiration conduct | People: tolling extends probation indefinitely. | Leiva: tolling preserves only adjudication for violations during the original period. | Tolling preserves jurisdiction to adjudicate violations during the original period, not indefinite extension. |
| Meaning of 'toll the running of the probationary period' | People: 'toll' means extend the period. | Leiva: 'toll' means abate/stop the running; otherwise absurd results. | Tolling is ambiguous; court rejects literal 'extend' but rejects absurd infinite extension; toll may abate but is not to indefinitely extend. |
| Constitutional and policy limits of tolling | People: tolling safeguards jurisdiction and due process in Morrissey/Vickers context. | Leiva: avoiding indefinite probation extension protects statutory time limits and due process. | Reading toll as indefinite extension raises due process and statutory-termination concerns; tolled only to preserve a timely Morrissey/Vickers hearing on a period-violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Tapia, 91 Cal.App.4th 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (tolling preserves jurisdiction to decide whether a violation occurred during the unextended probation)
- People v. DePaul, 137 Cal.App.3d 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (probation violation based on post-expiration conduct not allowed)
- People v. Lewis, 7 Cal.App.4th 1949 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (tolling not to create a 'free pass' for undetermined period)
- In re J. W., 29 Cal.4th 558 (Cal. 2002) (statutory construction and latent ambiguity guidance; avoid absurd results)
