People v. Leib, 2022 IL 126645

Defendant Donald Leib (a registered child sex offender) was charged under 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a) for knowingly being present on “real property comprising any school” during a parish/school festival on Sept. 26, 2015.
The festival included children’s rides and was held in the St. Louis Avenue parking lot, located across a public street from Queen of Martyrs school/gym; the parish owned the lot.
Witnesses conflicted: parish officials and some attendees described the lot as used for school functions (drop-off, athletic events, festival), while other parishioners and signage identified parish/church activities (bingo) and no signage identified the lot as school property.
A neighbor notified police after seeing Leib at the carnival; Officer McGreal confronted Leib, told him he should not be there, Leib cooperated and left; Leib later acknowledged understanding the neighbor’s concerns.
After a bench trial the circuit court convicted Leib and sentenced him to 12 months; a divided appellate court affirmed; the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave and affirmed the conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the St. Louis Ave. parking lot is “real property comprising any school” under 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a)	The lot is owned/used by the parish that includes the school, is used for school purposes, and therefore falls within the statute’s scope	The lot is separated from the school by a public street and functions as church property; “comprising” requires contiguity or direct school ownership/use	Yes. The phrase is not limited to contiguous property; the lot was used for school purposes and was part of the school/parish grounds, so it qualifies
Whether the State proved Leib “knowingly” was present on school property	Circumstantial evidence (festival layout, testimony that church and school are synonymous, presence of children’s rides, Leib’s acquiescence to leave) permits an inference Leib was aware of the substantial probability the lot was school grounds	No direct evidence put Leib on notice; mixed community belief, absence of school signage, and Leib’s cooperative conduct show lack of conscious awareness	Yes. Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could infer Leib was aware of the substantial probability the lot comprised school grounds

In re Jarquan B., 2017 IL 121483 (statutory interpretation principles)
People v. Legoo, 2020 IL 124965 (give effect to statute’s plain language)
People v. Brand, 2021 IL 125945 (sufficiency-of-evidence standard)
People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 (trier of fact resolves credibility and inferences)
McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (knowledge requires awareness of facts making conduct illegal)
Commonwealth v. Paige, 768 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. App. Ct. decision on contiguous property)
State v. Peterson, 490 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa case on property near school)
Stamps v. State, 620 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. decision treating noncontiguous overflow lot as not comprising school)