People v. Legoo
2020 IL 124965
Ill.2020Background
- Patrick Legoo was observed in Mendota’s Strouss Park by police; he was a registered child sex offender and was charged under 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) for knowingly being present in a public park.
- At trial Legoo said he rode to the park to retrieve his son, who refused to leave a baseball game; he spent under five minutes there. The State introduced his prior 2006 conviction for criminal sexual abuse.
- Legoo argued at trial that (1) the exception in 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a-10) (allowing a child sex offender to be in a park if accompanied by his own minor child) should be read into section 11-9.4-1(b), and (2) necessity/parental-rights concerns justified his presence; the trial court rejected necessity and convicted him of the misdemeanor.
- The appellate court affirmed, concluding the statutes overlap but differ in scope, prohibited conduct, and penalties, so no judicially read-in exception was warranted. 2019 IL App (3d) 160667.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, and affirmed the appellate court: 11-9.4-1(b) is a flat ban as written; the 11-9.3(a-10) exception does not get read into 11-9.4-1(b), and Legoo’s as-applied parental-rights challenge failed because he did not preserve or carry a necessity defense and there is no established fundamental right to be in a public park.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Legoo’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the exception in 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a-10) (parent/guardian exception) should be read into 11-9.4-1(b) | Statute 11-9.4-1(b) has plain language imposing a flat ban; no exception is present and courts must apply the text as written | The statutory scheme and history show intent to allow parents to accompany their children; the exception in 11-9.3(a-10) must be read into 11-9.4-1(b) to avoid conflict and absurdity | No; statutes differ in covered persons, prohibited conduct, and penalties—court may not judicially add exceptions to 11-9.4-1(b) absent clear legislative language |
| Whether 11-9.4-1(b) must be read to include the 11-9.3(a-10) exception to avoid an as-applied constitutional violation of parental liberty | The statute is presumptively constitutional; there is no recognized fundamental right to enter public parks and Legoo failed to establish necessity or show the statute, as applied, infringed a protected right | Legoo argued parental-rights infringement; he did not preserve a successful necessity defense and provided no authority that taking a child to a park is a fundamental right | Court rejected the as-applied constitutional claim (no fundamental right to park entry established and necessity defense not sustained) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034 (construed 11-9.4-1(b) as a complete ban on certain sex offenders’ presence in public parks)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parental right to rear children is a fundamental liberty interest)
- Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (right to enter public parks is not fundamental)
- People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338 (statutory provisions must be read as a whole and not rendered superfluous)