People v. Ledesma, 14 Cal. App. 5th 830

Background

Victim Rosalind F. was accosted after leaving a liquor store, threatened with a gun, taken behind nearby businesses, forced to the ground, and raped; semen on her clothing and SART swabs matched Ledesma's DNA.
Police arrested Alexander Xavier Ledesma, who testified he had consensual sex after offering money; jury rejected that defense and convicted him of rape (Pen. Code § 261(a)(2)) and kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209(b)(1)).
Jury found true One Strike Law allegations that the kidnapping substantially increased the risk of harm and that the victim was kidnapped to commit a sexual offense; jury found firearm-use allegations not true.
Trial court sentenced Ledesma to 25 years-to-life on the rape conviction under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61); sentences on the kidnapping count and related allegations were stayed under § 654.
On appeal Ledesma argued sections 209 (aggravated kidnapping) and 667.61 (One Strike asportation enhancement) are unconstitutionally vague under Johnson v. United States; the Attorney General conceded the abstract of judgment misstated a firearm finding.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are the asportation clauses in Penal Code § 209(b)(2) and § 667.61(d)(2) unconstitutionally vague under Johnson?	Ledesma: the statutes' "movement" and "substantially increased risk" language is impermissibly vague under Johnson's void-for-vagueness analysis.	People: the statutes require applying a qualitative standard to real-world facts (not an "imagined ordinary case"), and California caselaw provides clear guidance on relevant factors.	Court: Rejected Ledesma's vagueness challenge; statutes are constitutional because they apply qualitative standards to actual conduct and California precedent supplies an objective framework.
Did Johnson's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause control this case?	Ledesma: Johnson's reasoning extends to any statute using indeterminate "risk" language.	People: Johnson targeted a categorical, judge-imagined inquiry (the ACCA residual clause); California statutes require fact-based jury determinations, which Johnson expressly left intact.	Court: Johnson does not require invalidation here; the asportation tests differ materially from the ACCA residual clause.
Was the jury instruction/application of asportation sufficiently determinate under California law?	Ledesma: appellate disagreements show the standard is unworkable.	People: California decisions uniformly identify the inquiry and factors (scope/nature of movement, decreased detection, increased escape danger, opportunity for other crimes).	Court: California caselaw demonstrates a principled, objective standard; precedents guide juries and courts.
Should the abstract of judgment be corrected regarding firearm findings?	Ledesma: abstract incorrectly records a true firearm finding.	People/AG: Concedes the abstract is inaccurate and should be amended.	Court: Directed correction of the abstract to reflect only the true findings under § 667.61(e).

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (invalidating the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (U.S. 2016) (Johnson did not call into doubt laws applying qualitative standards to real-world conduct)
People v. Martinez, 20 Cal.4th 225 (Cal. 1999) (explaining asportation test: scope/nature of movement and risk increase factors)
People v. Vines, 51 Cal.4th 830 (Cal. 2011) (affirming aggravated kidnapping conviction and asportation standards)
People v. Dominguez, 39 Cal.4th 1141 (Cal. 2006) (summarizing jury considerations for asportation element)
People v. Morgan, 42 Cal.4th 593 (Cal. 2007) (void-for-vagueness principles; nonmathematical standards are often constitutionally permissible)