People v. Krisik
108 N.E.3d 273
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- On April 17, 2014 Donald Krisik allegedly choked and assaulted his then‑girlfriend Michelle Ghorley in front of family; police photos showed neck bruising. He was arrested the same day.
- Bond conditions prohibited contact with Ghorley; while in jail Krisik placed recorded phone calls to Ghorley and to his mother urging Ghorley to avoid service, leave the state, recant, and get witnesses to lie; he offered money to relocate.
- Investigators repeatedly were unable to serve subpoenas on Ghorley; she did not appear for trial, and her prior signed typewritten statement and preliminary‑hearing testimony were tendered by the State.
- The State moved to admit Ghorley’s out‑of‑court statements under the forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing doctrine (Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) and related statutory provisions), arguing Krisik’s misconduct caused her unavailability.
- The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Krisik’s wrongful communications (directly and through his mother) caused Ghorley’s unavailability and admitted her prior statements; Krisik was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated battery/aggravated domestic battery and sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ghorley’s prior testimonial statement was admissible under forfeiture by wrongdoing (Confrontation Clause) | State: Krisik’s recorded calls and conduct show he intended to, and did, procure Ghorley’s unavailability; thus her prior statements are admissible under forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing. | Krisik: The State failed to prove causation; Ghorley avoided service voluntarily and her absence was not caused by his conduct. | Court: Affirmed — State proved by preponderance that Krisik’s wrongful communications caused Ghorley’s unavailability; statements admitted. |
| Whether the trial court’s forfeiture finding was against manifest weight of evidence | State: Preponderance shown by timing, content of calls, defendant’s offers and instructions to avoid service, and subsequent failure to appear. | Krisik: Circumstantial evidence insufficient; alternative explanations (victim’s independent choice) prevail. | Court: Not against manifest weight; inference from circumstantial evidence and timing supports causation. |
| Whether the 16‑year sentence was excessive | State: Sentence within statutory range given defendant’s extensive criminal history; court balanced factors. | Krisik: Sentence excessive considering nature of offense, minimal injury, mostly nonviolent record, and alleged court misunderstanding about good‑time credits. | Court: Sentence within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion; no evidence of misunderstanding or improper speculation. |
| Whether trial court relied improperly on speculation about good‑time credits in imposing sentence | State: Court corrected sentence downward from 17 to 16 years after confirming 85% truth‑in‑sentencing. | Krisik: Court improperly speculated about whether he would earn/keep good‑time credits when justifying the sentence. | Court: No abuse of discretion; statements do not show misunderstanding of sentencing structure or improper basis for sentence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (testimonial hearsay and Confrontation Clause)
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing rationale and intent requirement)
- People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246 (Illinois discussion of forfeiture by wrongdoing and proof standard)
- People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149 (sentencing discretion standard)
- Maestas v. [State], 412 P.3d 79 (use of circumstantial evidence to infer causation for forfeiture by wrongdoing)
- People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738 (post‑discovery misconduct supports inference of intent to render witness unavailable)